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Foreword

As we enter a new millennium, many nations are striving to acquire advanced
weapons of war. Since the 1980s, the most favored symbols and instruments of
power among lesser powers have been theater ballistic missiles. In concert with
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction, theater ballistic
missile systems present a challenge to American military forces, threatening
three vital centers of gravity: the forces themselves, the unity and resolve of
potential regional partners and allies, and the political will of the United States
to exercise a military option.
In the next decade, sea-based ballistic missile defense will offer joint power
projection forces a vital, flexible, and increasingly robust theater defense
capability. Weapon and sensor development; communications, computers, and
intelligence architectures; and battle management command and control issues
are all being addressed with vigor-a measure of the gravity of this evolving and
imminent threat.
However, defensive power from the sea emerges from a unique and complex
arena, where combat takes place in three dimensions against many dissimilar
threats, in three overlapping and competing environments which, by their very
nature, cause conflicting tasking of limited assets. Therefore, the promise of naval
theater ballistic missile defense must be studied with this operational complexity
in mind.
In this Newport Paper, which or iginated as an Advanced Research Project in
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, Commander
Swicker proposes that naval theater ballistic missile defense can realize its full
potential only if the Maritime Component Commander understands and
addresses the key issues involved in its operational employment. I urge all
involved in conceptualizing, planning, and executing naval surface warfare to
take heed of his deep and discerning examination, which provides valuable
insights and encourages us to address the full range of possibilities for, and
requirements upon, tomorrow's naval theater ballistic missile defense.

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Introduction

A sense of urgency informs Theater Ballistic Missile Defensefrom the Sea: Issues
for the Maritime Component Com mander. Theater ballistic missiles armed with
chemical, biological, or nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will be
acquired and deployed by hostile forces in the developing world, posing an
imminent threat to the us. and coalition forces that must operate in that world.
The gravity of this evolving threat is recognized in our national military strategy.
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD)
systems are also evolving, but with the exception of the Patriot

PAC-2 missile

system, none are yet fielded. Recognizing this constraint, this study looks ten
years ahead, to 200S, toward the challenge of joint and multinational power
projection operations against a TBM-WMD armed adversary. In such a regional
contingency, the first TBMD-capable forces on the scene are likely to be naval. It
will thus be the duty of the Joint Force Maritime Component Comman der to
plan, fight, and win the initial TBMD battle in order to enable the introduction
of follow-on TBMD forces from the other Service components, as the campaign
moves inland from the littoral.
This study's particular value lies in the attention it invites towards issues that
concern

the Joint

Force

Maritime

Component

Commander

in

his

responsibility to perform the essential enabling task of delivering TBMD from
the sea. To this end, I spent the summ er of 1995 reviewing the current literature,
followed by research trips to several key "nodes" within the naval and joint
theater ballistic missile defense communities. These visits included Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division; the Program Executive Office,
T heater Air Defense

(PEO TAD-B); the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization;

and the office of the Navy's Director for Theater Air Warfare (NS65). This
initial effort led to my further travel as an observer for the TBMD Wargame 95B
held at the National Test Facility, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, in
September, and finally to a personal project briefing for Rear Admiral Rodney
Rempt (then NS65) at Newport, Rhode Island, in October.
This five-chapter, unclassified study is designed to raise more questions than it
answers. With that purpose in mind, expeditious accessibility and wide
dissemination are essential to facilitate further research-thus the specific intent
to remain unclassified. The properly cleared reader, however, is encouraged to
pursue potential areas of further inquiry at any appropriate level of classification,
using the more than seventy military and non-military sources in the
bibliography as points of departure.
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Chapter I details the purpose of the study as well as its enabling assumptions.
The specifics of future conflict and the actual capabilities of yet-to-be-fielded
systems cannot be determined in advance. This paper, however, is not devoted to
an in-depth examination of specific technical issues-and indeed cannot be, due
to both its unclassified nature and, more importantly, the inability to discuss in
detail that which is still being developed. The intent is to examine, at the level of
the flag officer serving as the Joint Force Maritime Component Comman der
OFMCC), the impliCfJtions of these capabilities and the difficult issues to which
they will give rise in the future. To discuss these issues in a meaningful manner ,
certain capabilities and conditions must be assumed.
Chapter II provides the reader with a brief overview of the TBM-WMD
threat that will face US. forces in the near ter m and into the future. Cur rent
active defense capabilities against that threat are explained, as are the potential
consequences of any diminution ofTBMD research and development in the face
of continuing budgetar y constraints. The chapter concludes with a survey of
projected US. naval theater ballistic missile defense capabilities to the year 2008.
The central portion of the study, chapter III, establishes a set of first principles
that enables the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander facing a
TBM-WMD

threat to focus

his

attention. Each

of the

four areas

of

concentration-Logistics; Command, Control, and Intelligence; Warfighting;
and Rules of Engagement-is examined to place the operational challenge of
theater ballistic missile defense within the multimission complexity of mar itime
warfare in a littoral theater.
Successfully performed, TBMD is unlikely to remain a purely naval mission.
Indeed, the vital nature of naval TBMD is to enable complementary Army and
Air Force systems to enter the theater and contribute to the battle. According to
the National Military Strategy, allied and coalition assets will also be, whenever
possible, an integral part of such a US. effort. Chapter IV examines potential
joint and multinational contributions to the campaign's overall TBMD
operations.
Finally, chapter V summarizes the study by considering the essential nature of
theater ballistic missile defense through specific defining characteristics derived
from the preceding sections. These essential TBMD "themes" are:
•

The challenge of conflicting missions and limited means.

•

The reality of hard choices.

•

The fact that theater ballistic missile defense is one mission enabling many ,
rather than an end in itself.

xii
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The pervasive impact of these themes on both theater ballistic missile defense
forces and the officers who control and direct these forces is examined to
illustrate that

TBMD is

an enabling capability.

Given the likelihood of a dispersed, Theater Wide

TBMD battle, the

challenge of logistics illustrates the value of a straightfor ward operations analysis
approach to the vital discussion of fuel and vertical launch system rearming-a
discussion which reveals the true complexity of war in the littoral, where the

TBMD mission will not exist in isolation.
The area of command, control, and intelligence considers that same
complexity at three different levels: above the ]FMCC at the

NCA level; among
competing component commanders at the theater level; and from the ]FMCC
down to the unit leveL Significant operational friction is held to exist at every
level: political versus military objectives up the chain of command; mission
versus mission at the theater level; and effective decentralized control versus
efficient

centralized

control

of

TBMD engagements down the chain.

Encompassing them all, comprehensive intelligence preparation of the battle
space is essential to the ]FMCC's mastery of the

TBMD mission's subtleties and

thus his ability to make the hard choices necessary for effective execution.
Warfighting specifies some of the hard choices that will face the

]FMCC

owing to his own logistical limitations and the operational priorities of his
super ior s. The logistically competing but operationally complementary natures
of Navy Theater Wide (upper tier) capability and Navy Area Oower tier) are
considered. This discussion illustrates the vast potential defensive leverage of
upper-tier systems as well as the essential requirement for lower-tier systems in
the conduct of amphibious power projection.
The vital issues of national policy and inter national law which must infor m
US. theater ballistic missile defense operations are presented under the rubric of
Rules of Engagement. The confluence of political constraints on US. actions
and the tactical challenges posed by the speed and lethality of enemy

TBM-WMD systems will likely result in t wo trends: Defensive TBMD ROE (i.e.,
TBMs) will become increasingly per missive, while offensive
TBMD ROE (i.e., Attack Operations-"Scud-hunting") will remain centrally
controlled and highly restrictive. The ]FMCC and his subordinate commanders

engaging incoming

must be able to operate effectively within the bounds of this dichotomy.
The conundrum posed by conflicting missions that must be executed within
limited means affects theJoint Force Maritime Component Commander's every
decision when confronting the

TBM-WMD challenge. A clear grasp of his

superiors' operational intent will allow an initial triage of missions, sorting out
what must be done now from what can wait; but even then the tyranny of
Xttl
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numbers and the challenge of distance may force assets to be apportioned more
thinly than doctrine demands.
Conducting operations while facing a
the

TBM-WMD threat will require that

JFMCC make hard choices. These decisions will be all-encompassing and

continuous, part of an iterative process of evaluating mission prior ity, unit
tasking, tautness of command and control, degree of political constraint, and the
impact of the

NCA's overall intent on the TBMD rules of engagement that are in

place. Making these difficult choices in a timely, forthright manner and,
whenever possible, in accordance with Joint

TBMD doctrine, will help ensure a

smooth transition of the TBMD fight when the campaign begins to move inland
from the littoral.
Such a transition will have been made possible only through a successful

TBMD battle waged by the maritime component "holding open the door" for
follow-on TBMD forces deploying into the theater thus defended. This
capability cannot be considered in isolation. Theater ballistic missile defense in
general, and

TBMD delivered from the sea in particular, is the means that enables
TBM threat.

the successful conduct of other operations in the face of the

This study presents a preliminary analysis of the many inherent and
unavoidable complexities of

TBMD conducted from the sea. As present and

future commanders envision this mission and prepare the Navy to meet its
challenges, they should recognize that, however important

TBMD certainly will

become, it will be a supporting and enabling function for other naval and joint
operations. Most importantly, they should find the principal lessons of this study
illuminating, realistic, and deserving of additional detailed investigation.

XIV

I
Assutnptions for Discussion

T

HE u.s. NAVAL THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, tasked against
the threat of ballistic missiles that may be armed with Weapons of Mass

Destruction

(WMD) , will be one of the new, key military capabilities deployed in

support of joint operations over the next ten years. Technical development issues
and doctrinal comman d and control questions are g radually being resolved as
near-term systems approach initial operational capability. As with many new
military capabilities, programs and studies tend to focus on discrete areas rather
than on an integrating overview of flag-level concerns affecting operational
naval

TBMD. This paper addresses that need by examining the issues that the

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may need to consider when
operating against a

TBM-WMD threat.

The intended approach of this study is straightforward, written by a serving
surface line officer with extensive

AEGIS experience.The assumptions that

inform the remainder of the study are detailed immediately to avoid the loss of
credibility by a reader who encounters "emergent assumptions" down the line.
The nature of the missile and

WMD proliferation threat and the worldwide
TBMD
challenge, now and into the future. The basic tenets of Joint TBMD are set forth,

dynamics that drive it provide a background in the nature of the

and the current baseline capabilities to respond to the threat are examined along
with an overview of naval active defense

TBMD capabilities as currently

projected to 2008.
Chapter III is the heart of this study. In logical progression, it sorts and sets forth
those

critical

issues

to

which

the Joint

Force

Maritime

Component

Commander must pay personal attention when tasked to operate against a

TBM-WMD threat.Quite simply: what questions will keep him awake at night,
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and how might he possibly address them? Much like a Defense Support
Program (DSP) satellite will soon cue a TBMD AEGIS cruiser, the intended
purpose of this study is to detect and pass on the nature and parameters of the
problem, not to consummate the intercept and solve that problem. Too much is
yet uncertain; too much is still evolving. This paper is successful if it illustrates
the scope and direction of that evolution, thereby providing a sound intellectual
basis for dealing with uncertainty.

An Unprecedented Challenge
Theater ballistic missiles transcend the accepted boundaries of conventional
warfare. In speed and altitude, they exceed the envelope of conventional Air
Warfare

(AW) defenses. In range, they may cross AOR boundaries of

geographic CINCs, thus exceeding the "envelope" of traditional in-theater
command and control. When armed with weapons of mass destruction or
targeted against population centers, the asymmetric political leverage they
potentially provide to otherwise impotent aggressors is a new and profoundly
unsettling phenomenon. The military response to such unprecedented
capability must inevitably be joint.
In an era of reduced U.S. presence overseas, the first American theater ballistic
missile defense capability on the scene of a developing crisis is likely to come
from the sea-but it will be enabled, supported, and eve ntually reinforced by the
complementary capabilities of all branches and possibly bolstered by the
synergistic contributions of allies and coalition partners. The ability of these
forces to stand firm, build up, and wrest the initiative from hostile forces either
diplomatically or operationally may well rest on the ability of the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander to execute the theater ballistic missile
defense mission, not in isolation, but in the midst of the messy complexity of
multimission warfare in the littoral.

Bounding the Problem.

The current state of ferment in the TMD/TBMD arena

is the sure sign of a dynamic challenge dynamically addressed. Different
concepts, architectures, and systems compete for funding and patronage in an
evolutionary process that will eventually produce coherent doctrine and
capable hardware. However, in order to examine the theater ballistic missile
defense issues

of

concern

to

the Joint Force

Maritime

Component

Commander in 2008, the problem must be bounded. The following
assumptions do so:

2
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•

This study is primarily concerned with the active defense capability of
naval theater ballistic missile defenses under the command of a Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander in a littoral theater in 2008.

•

In 2008, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will have
available Navy Area TBMD capability, using the SM2 Block IVA interceptor.

•

Navy Theater Wide (NTW) capability also will be operational in the form

•

All Navy TBMD interceptors will be launched by AEGIS combatants.

•

The projected basic theater ballistic missile defense BMC4I (battle

of the SM3 exoatmospheric interceptor.

management

command,

control,

communications,

computers,

and

intelligence) architecture of a joint planning network QPN), joint data
network QDN), and joint composite tracking network QCTN) will have
been implemented. These new networks will be based on current
initiatives: the global command and control system (GCCS) and the joint
maritime command information system QMCIS) for the ]PN; the joint

tactical information distribution system QTIDS/ LINK

16)

cooperative engagement capability (CEC) for the ]CTN.
•

1

for the ]DN;

Stereo defense support program (DSP) satellite TBM launch-cueing
information of the type now received and processed by the joint tactical
ground station QTAGS) will be available on board AEGIS combatants.

•

SBIRS-LOW, the space-based infrared system-low earth orbit component
of the space and missile tracking system SMTS (derived from the SDIO
Brilliant Eyes concept) will not yet be operational

2

As theater ballistic missile defense concepts continue to evolve, common
themes emerge from otherwise disparate documents. It is assumed that by 2008,
some of these themes will be fully accepted as tenets of joint theater ballistic
missile defense doctrine, to include:
•

The keystone of effective theater ballistic missile defense is centralized
3
planning with coordinated, decentralized executlOn.

•

Theater ballistic missile defense is considered a subset of theater missile
defense (TMD), and thus of theater air defense (TAD), rather than a
separate mission.

•

Within the joint TAD chain-of-command,
commander

(AADC)

the Area Air Defense

is responsible for TBMD active defense, while the

Joint Force Air Component Commander OFACC) is responsible for

TBMD attack operations (offensive operations directed against TBM
launchers, C2 nodes, and support infrastructure).

3
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Operational Assump tions. Finally, this study examines what is asswned to be the
most challenging kind of operational contingency envisioned for a U.S. Joint
Force Maritime Component Commander:
•

An emergent crisis in 2008 involving an undeveloped theater, facing a

littoral opponent from the developing world who possesses multiple
WMD-capable TBM systems.
•

This WMD threat includes a baseline weaponized (20kt fission/single
reentry vehicle-per-TBM) nuclear capability.

•

Some enemy TBM systems have sufficient range to hold the capitals and
major population centers of possible U.S. regional coalition partners at
risk.

•

Potential regional allies have no organic TBMD capability. However,
some of their TACAIR, SOF, and C2 assets could contribute to
multinational attack operations, and their naval forces could contribute to
non-TBMD maritime tasking.

•

US. ground-based TBMD systems are not forward deployed in the
region, and the ports and airfields through which they will be delivered
are currently undefended against TBM attack. Once the ports and airfields
are secure, US. Army THAAD (theater high altitude area defense) and
Patriot PAC-3 (ERINT) will be available. MEADS, the mediwn extended
air defense system (formerly known as CORPS SAM), entangled in
budgetary infighting since the mid-1990s, is not yet available.

•

Air Force wide-body transport (B747) airborne laser (ABL) platforms are
operational, but have not yet been deployed to the as-yet undefended
airfields in theater.

•

The Joint Force Commander views amphibious power projection as an
option in his concept of operations (CONOPS). Several potential
amphibious objective areas are under consideration.

•

Enemy short-range missile capabilities (SS-21, FROG-7, SMERCH
multiple launch rocket system) are robust , as are his littoral defense
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), mine warfare capabilities (MIW), diesel
submarine and fast patrol boat forces. On paper, his air order of battle is
impressive, but his level of pilot training and quality of aircraft
maintenance are questionable. His air arm has never faced an opponent
possessing US.-Ievel proficiency.
While other kinds of situations are expected to arise, the above conditions are
regarded as the most stressing while remaining within the time frame of the next
decade.
4

Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Overview

s

A

THE

NEW MILLENNIUM APPROACHES, the United States looks out

on a world in ferment-nations and peoples attempting to define their place

in an international order shattered by the end of nearly three generations under a
bipolar system. Pessimists preach a dark future: "Technology is changing how man
knows, and the resulting dislocations are culturally cataclysmic. Half the world is
4
looking for God anew, and the other half is behaving as if no god exists.,, Optimists
couch their views in terms reflecting the dichotomy within the common Chinese
character for chaos and opportunity. "We live at a fantastic moment of human
history ... The spread of the Third Wave economy has galvanized all of the Asia
Pacific region, introducing trade and strategic tensions, but at the same time opening
s
the possibility of rapidJy raising a billion human beings out of the pit of povetty."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff take the middle ground and see "a world in which
threats are widespread and uncertain, and where conflict is probable, but too
6
often unpredictable.,, To the ]CS, that world holds four principal dangers for the
United States:
•

Regional instability

•

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

•

Transnational dangers [e.g. terrorism, drugs], and

•

Dangers to democracy and reform.

7

Threat, Vulnerability, and Defense
These four challenges are intertwined in a dynamic that is emerging from
the confluence of international instability and the worldwide diffus ion of
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technology. As more and more nations consider themselves to be standing alone
before their enemies, no longer sheltered by the suzerainty of a superpower, they
also are increasingly able to buy, steal, or indigenously develop the technologies
through which they hope to "achieve strategic security-the chance of a
millennium."s Often, these striving nations believe that this chance is to be
found in the complementary technologies and synergistic power of theater
ballistic missiles and

the

second

"principal

danger"-weapons

of

mass

destruction.
TBM

and

Evolution,

WMD Proliferation.

whether

of

organisms

or

organizations, arises from the selective pressure exerted by the surrounding
environment and will continue for the duration of that pressure. The selective
pressure of the international environment may drive the leaders of developing
nations to acquire theater ballistic missiles as a means to achieve strategic
security, both for their people and for themselves. This is the vital, indeed primal,
"demand side" of the proliferation equation. W hy nations who otherwise lack
significant political or military leverage wish to acquire such disproportionate
capabilities is often more important than how they achieve that goal. In a world
of increasingly decentralized technology and an ever-expanding base of
scientific knowledge, these nations

will succeed. Unless

the pressure for nations

to assure their own strategic security can be eliminated, supply-side controls on
proliferation are doomed to eventual f ailure. Determined proliferators will arm
themselves before they will feed their people. For example:
The Iraqi government has used a covert network of purchasing agents and dummy
companies to buy millions of dollars worth of sensitive missile parts from firms in
Europe and Russia .... The missile-related orders reflect Iraq's willingness to spend
tens of millions of dollars to rebuild a key facet of its prewar military capability,
even though the country's leaders claim it is financially strapped:

Consider what Third-World nations stand to gain from such decisions. These
weapons confer national prestige upon a regime and its leader; they allow
formidable international intimidation of regional foes; and they are available on
the world arms market as turnkey systems with required training levels that are
achievable in the developing world.
No longer the exclusive Cold War preserve of Nato and the Warsaw Pact,
TBMs have been successfully employed in tribal civil wars in Mghanistan and
Yemen, proving that neither a national technical infrastructure nor a highly
trained tactical air ar m is necessary to strike quickly and deeply at an enemy's key
military and political targets.10 Even against a nation with modern, well-trained
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forces, unless capable theater ballistic missile defenses are fielded, such strikes will
get through, expending replaceable TBM "ammunition" rather than valuable
TACAIR pilots.

11

By 2008, more than twenty countries will be able to field some form ofTBM
capability, including key regional powers in the £lashpoints of northeast Asia, the
South China Sea littoral, the Indian subcontinent, southwest Asia, the Levant,
and North Mrica. International efforts to counter TBM proliferation, including
such Western supply-side "technology cartels" as the missile technology control
regime (MTCR)

,

may increasingly push these same nations toward the

development of indigenous technology.
The nature of indigenous technology in the Third World will tend to limit
missile accuracy more than it will warhead lethality In this regard, the
intelligence

community

will

have

to

closely

monitor

emergent

TBM

applications of global positioning system (CPS) technology. In general, however,
the precise guidance systems necessary to achieve a small circular error probable
(CEP)

with a ballistic system are, simply, more difficult to design and

manufacture than are, for example, basic chemical warheads for that same system.
This "selective pressure" will thus encourage the evolution of systems with poor
accuracy but powerful payloads.
Historically, the targets of choice for systems thus constrained have been
civilian population centers-large, soft, stationary targets of dubious military
value but of great political importance. Therefore, these systems may not be able
to defeat a developed nation militarily, but they can confer potent political
leverage through the threat, as French strategic planners once put it, of "tearing
off an arm."
Readiness to exercise that option, though, may not be constrained by
traditional concepts of strategic deterrence. Speaking specifically of small
nuclear forces in the developing world, Jerome Kahan identifies three factors
which increase the likelihood of use for

any form ofWMD:

Strategic discourse between . .. adversaries may be nonexistent, raising the
prospect of a breakdown in deterrence at the regional level. ...
Third World states tend to have imperfect and incomplete intelligence in
formation about their relative positions in a conflict ....
Small nuclear forces, especially in the hands of technically unsophisticated
cOUfltries, may well be deficient in command and control arrangements.

7
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Thus, by 2008, the United States may face a variety of regional powers
deploying tenuously controlled TBM systems of prodigious reach with
problematic accuracy offset by powerful warheads.
Why, in a discussion of theater ballistic missile defense, should weapons of
mass destruction, especially nuclear WMD, be emphasized when these devices
have yet to be combined with TBMs and used in regional conflict? The
"leverage" inherent in a given weapon system derives, in part, from how
effectively it can engage and neutralize its intended target. During Operation
DESERT STORM, the United States gained great leverage from the
conventionally armed Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), successfully
conducting operational fires with this weapon, to the full depth of the theater, in
the critical early days of the war. That leverage was gained by what was, in effect,
nothing more than a slow-flying 1,OOO-lb. bomb. However, TLAM was in reality
a "system of systems;' a weapon whose nominal power was multiplied by precise
accuracy gained from complex guidance systems, systems in turn supported by
an unrivalled National Technical Intelligence system, a comprehensive
Mapping, Charting and Geodesy system, and a mission-planning system
employing a national network of experts with access to massive computational
power. All the missile had to do was fly to a given point in three dimensions and
explode-but the synergistic support systems that planned the mission for that
one missile had marked and mensurated that point to within inches.
In developing nations, these support systems are generally missing. National
technical intelligence with which to conduct strategic reconnaissance is limited
or nonexistent (as noted by Kahan). In a permissive prehostilities environment,
an intelligence operative with a hand-held GPS can record the coordinates of a
stationary target, but the TBM system tasked against that target is unlikely to be
able to take advantage of the precision thus provided. Though enhanced ballistic
missile systems that approach U.S. cruise missile accuracy will someday be
fielded, supply-side proliferation controls and the resultant limitations of
indigenous technology will tend to push that day into the future. Thus, while
First World land attack cruise missiles gain their leverage through stealth and
accuracy derived from a system of systems, Third World theater ballistic missiles
stand alone and must rely on speed and brute force.
The solution for poor targeting of denied areas and poor system accuracy
once a TBM gets there is to increase warhead lethality. As long as accuracy
remains constrained, this is an evolutionary imperative for TBM systems and
therefore represents an imminent threat for TBMD forces. In 1991, crude
chemical warheads were available for Iraqi Scuds, but were not used. In 2008,
TBM-weaponized WMD could include bulk chemical and biologic warheads,
8
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chemical

submunitions, and

that

most

challenging

threat

of

all-the

TBM-carried nuclear weapon.
Much debate currently swirls about the defensive difficulties posed by var ious
incarnations of putative chemical submunition warheads. The sound and fury of
these cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) arguments tend to push
the reality of the nuclear threat into an indeterminate future scenario. Modern
chemical weapons are indeed deadly, and it is possible to design a worst-case
submunition warhead to car ry them, which wilJ give TBMD interceptor
engineers cold sweats-but an important fact gets lost in the debate. Chemicals
and bioagents kill. Nuclear weapons obliterate.
Since August 1945, nuclear weapons have had a special resonance in world
affairs, unmatched by the other two members of the WMD unholy trinity. The
use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts has been universally decried-and,
in those cases, univer sally tolerated. One wonders what the world community
would have done if the final offensives of the Iran-Iraq war had been heralded by
tactical nuclear exchanges rather than by the muffied midnight bursts of mustard
and cyanide shells. Likewise, had the Libyan CW plant at Rabta actually been
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), might it not have disappeared under
a swar m of TLAM long before the hardened facility at Tarhuna was built?
Also, note that the Ball istic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) draft
Theater Missile Defense Co mmand and Control Plan contains a nuclear-not a
biological, not a chemical-annex, for nuclear weapons attack everything
simultaneously, burning, blasting, poisoning, and

causing

the

C2-vital

electromagnetic spectrum to fibrillate even as they turn the very sand to ash and
glass.
Proliferators in the developing world know this. Chemical and biological
weapons are more easily produced-but they are the B-Team. A-Team
capability is available for a sufficient investment of time and treasure. Israel, India,
Pakistan, South Mrica, and North Korea know this. It is hoped that before the
murder of Hussein Kamel al-Majid in March 1996, the intelligence community
interrogated the Iraqi inner-circle defector and WMD-development chief
concerning the details of the Iraqi nuclear program in early 1991-thereby
suggesting how the similar Iranian program may be progressing today. "The
Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology mirrors the push by
President Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear bomb in Iraq over the last 15 years.
The Iranians use many of the old Iraqi smuggling routes and contacts ... ,,\3 Both
.

in the Gulf and beyond, the TBM-WMD threat is imminent. By expedience and
necessity, that threat in the short term will be chemical and biological. By
evolutionary imperative, the threat in the future will be nuclear.
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Three Centers of Gravity.

WMD capability will give theater ballistic missiles a

degree of leverage they have not heretofore demonstrated. Conventional Scuds
arcing into Haifa and Tel Aviv presented the United States with a severe, but
ultimately manageable, operational and diplomatic challenge. The same could
not have been said if the Scuds had been carrying weapons of mass destruction.
WMD-capable TBMs will be able to hold at risk not only specific individual
targets, but entire centers of gravity, both military and political.
At the operational-tactical level of conflict, an enemy so equipped can
threaten the military center of gravity consisting of the opposing power
projection force itself. One way of doing this would be to interdict por ts,
airfields, supply depots, and fixed assembly areas.14 Aggressor forces employed
chemical TBM bar rages against just this target set early in the northeast Asia
MRC of Global Wargame '95.15 Using conventional TBMs, the Iraqi militar y
attempted the same tactic, for the same reasons, against rear areas such as Jubayl,
Saudi Arabia, in 1991.16 These conventional attacks were largely ineffective.
However, were a credible chemical, biological, or nuclear threat posed, it
probably would force the assembly, concentration, and resupply of a power
projection force to take place outside the range of hostile TBM systems; such a
threat-induced operational requirement would make the movement-to-contact
phase of a major campaign significantly more complex and costly.
Also at the operational-tactical level of conflict, a second way of attacking the
militar y center of gravity is to use the TBM-WMD system against concentrated
formations of combat forces. Hence, the DESERT STORM model of massive
force

marshaled,

magnified,

then

suddenly

unleashed

in

high

tempo,

synchronized combat probably will be difficult to emulate. Heavy ground forces
concentrating in fixed assembly areas in theater would likely be superseded by
more maneuverable (thus more survivable, albeit lighter) forces deployed from
longer range-perhaps by means of an extended period of air and naval str ike
tasking, followed by airborne and amphibious operations that would themselves
attempt to minimize their suitability as targets for WMD.
At the operational level of war, the WMD-TBM vulnerable center of gravity is
political:

the

cohesion

of

U.S.-allied

regional

coalitions.

Multinational

operations are an integral part of the national military strategy, for "our Armed
Forces will most otten fight in concer t with regional allies and friends, as
coalitions can decisively increase combat power and lead to a more favorable
outcome to a conflict.,,17 However, when facing a TBM-armed adversary during
the time frame of this study, the ter r itory of the United States itself is unlikely to
be directly threatened, while that of regional allies may well be. If that threat is
chemical, biological, or nuclear, the political leadership of likely coalition
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partners may look to their own strategic security and decide that making
common cause with the United States against a local hegemon is not an
attractive option. "A window for internationally supported military action
against a proliferator may close as the country gains the capability to retaliate
against additional countries at greater ranges.,,18
If, however, the National Command Authorities see US. vital interests set
sufficiently at risk, the nation can pursue unilateral military action. This is a
fundamental tenet of the national military strategy. However, such a course not
only risks potential collateral damage to, and direct retaliation against , US. friends
in the region, but also focuses attention on a vital and vulnerable third center of
gravity at the strategic level of war: the political will of the American people.
Since facing German mustard gas and phosgene in 1918, American forces
have not had to operate on a WMD battlefield, and the American body politic
has

never felt the stunning shock of a nuclear weapon. While overwhelming

American conventional military superiority can directly threaten a regional
enemy's ability to make war on American forces, that enemy could in turn use
TBM-delivered WMD capability to threaten American will to make war on him.
In the media age, US. military action is increasingly dependent on the
vicissitudes of public support-and the American public does not support long
wars or heavy casualties. The public reaction to hostile use of weapons of mass
destruction, covered minute by minute on

CNN, might well collapse popular

support for national policy.
Emotional popular reaction can sway policy either way, however. Thousands
slain at Pearl Harbor stiffened national will, while eighteen dead in Mogadishu
catalyzed withdrawal. Public perception of world events cannot always be
accurately predicted by military and political professionals. What is certain,
though, is that in our democracy, however imperfect, public perception
determines public support for national military action; and if the strategic
security of the United States is not perceived to be at risk, that support might
well evaporate. The initiation of armed conflict is the ultimate expression of the
political will of the people of a democracy, and such conflict cannot long
continue unsupported by that will. 19

Fou, Pillars oJTBMD. An imminent threat to these vital centers of gravity-the
military force itself, the cohesion of a regional alliance or coalition, and the
political will of the American people-demands a robust response . As theater
ballistic missile defense systems and doctrine have evolved since DESERT
STORM, discussions of Joint TBMD capability have settled upon a common
construct of "Four Pillars ofTBMD" -actually, three pillars and a plinth: Active
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D efense, Attack Operations, and Passive D efense, all supported by a base of
Battle Management Co mman d, Control , Communications , Computers , and
Intelligence (BMC4I) .
TBMD active defense, the interception of theat er ballistic missiles in flight , is
the focus of this study; it is the centerpie ce of naval TBMD cap abilitie s. In the era
of the Soviet threat , an early basic tenet of U.S. naval antiair warfare doctrine was
"Shoot the archer, not the arrow." De struction of strike aircraft offered far
greater defensive leverage than attempts to individually intercept their inbound
weapons. S ince TBMs are ground-launched, active defense assets must face the
arrows, and this constraint define s the n ature of active defense o perations.
Entirely aside from the mechanical and mathematical challenges posed by
small, high-speed balJistic targets, active defense is innately diffIcult because it
must start out from "behind the power curve." Planning for TBMD active
defense attempts to c ompensate for the challenging nature of the target by
working to achieve defense in-depth: early sensor cuein g, followed by multiple
shot opportunities for complementary interceptor systems throughout the
course of an inbound missile's flight. In the Joint TBMD environment of 2 008 ,
this might include airborne laser attacks against a the ater b allistic missile while it
is still in boost phase (ascending, rocket motor burning) ; Theater Wide TBMD
system attack during ascent phase (after boost , before apoge e) ; multiple Theater
Wide system int erception opportunities during midcourse flight (after apoge e,
before re entry) ; and endgame attacks by area defense TBMD systems in the
terminal phase (following re entry) .
The defining characteristics of TBMD active defense thus include :
•

The need for the earliest possible warning ofTBM preparation and launch ,
along with the most rapid netted cueing of active defense sensors and
systems;

•

A related requirement for close, highly automated coordination between
complementary defensive systems in the joint environment;

•

A tactical preference for systems that achieve intercept e arly in the TBM
traj ectory in order to mitigate WMD warhead effects and avoid the need
for single-target endgame defense ; and,

•

Rigorous fire discipline and reliable kill assessment to prevent wasteful
expenditure of a limited interceptor inventory.

All of these requirements are likely to be magnified by a p otential force
mismatch between the number of TBMD interceptors available in theater and
the number of TBMs in the enemy order of battle at the outset of hostilities.
Attack

operations-aggressive

interdiction

of enemy TBM assets

and

infrastructure on the ground-have the highest potential defensive leverage and
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p ose by far the greatest operational challenge of any pill ar of TBMD. If succe ssful,
they can destroy missiles and associated WMD before launch , decimate vehicles
and infrastructure to prevent further launches, and put fearful pressure on enemy
TBM transpor ter-erector-Iauncher (TEL) crews to run , hide, and fire in sloppy
h aste-if at all. If, on the other hand, the friendly force 's attack operations are
relatively unsuccessful , they can entangle vast numbers of strike, t anker, and
reconnaissance aircraft needed elsewhere in theater, and fruitlessly risk highly
trained special operations personnel deep in enemy territory.
Along with basic passive defense measures and area defense-capable Patriot
active defense, rudimentary attack operations formed the only coalition TBMD
capability available during DESERT STORM ; the results were decidedly mixed.
Attack op erations will evolve and advance by 2008, but they will still have to be
able t o overcome the basic challenge they face today-an e xtremely demanding
tactical timeline.
A defining construct for attack op erations is the military mnemonic of the
"OODA Loop;' the cycle of observe, orien t , decide, act. The combatant who has
sufficient information and agility to consistently operat e "inside " his opp onent's
OODA loop, deciding and acting faster, is likely to prevail. Against TEL-mobile
TBMs, the attack op erations O O DA cycle is very challenging. Attack assets,
either airborne or ground-based, must be in p osition, armed, fueled, and alert
when a TBM launch occurs or a TEL is detected. The se assets must then b e able
to orient on their designated target and initiate an attack before the TEL moves
and hides. The decision timeline from detection to attack is measured in
minutes, and is still not consistently met , even years after DESERT STORM.
During the Roving Sands 95 Joint Tactical Air Op erations ExerCIse, " even with
special operations forces and a Pioneer unmanne d aerial vehicle dedicated to
locating [an]

battery, it successfully fired all missiles-many with
2
[simulated] chemical warheads-against some 20 corps and division tar ets.,, 0
SS-2 1

g

Furthermore, although attack operations form a pillar of the ater ballistic
missile defense, the nature of these actions is distinctly offensive, carried out by
U. S . or coalition forces on territory c ontrolled by the enemy. Rules of
engagement and command and control issues are therefore c ertain to be
different and likely to be more constrained than those associated with active
defense. While a commander may se e much t o be gained through the vigorous
pursuit of attack operations, his actual fre edom to carry them out , esp ecially in
the early days of a conflict (when active defense forces are likely to be severely
challenged) may nonetheless be distinctly circumscribed.
The defining characteristics of TBMD attack operations include:
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•

High defensive leverage due to a potential ability to prevent or degrade
TBM launches and destroy

WMD

on enemy territory;

•

High difficulty and high danger due to a compressed decision cycle and

•

A ne ed to address the emergent threat of an enemy's coordinated use of
21
highly capable SAMs (e . g. , SA- 12) to defend TBM launch areas;

the need for operations in or over enemy territory;

•

The likelihood that mission execution and rules of engagement will be
under very restrictive centralized control; and,

•

The imperative

for

continuous

improvement

of sensor-to-shooter

connectivity and cross-service linkage of j oint sensors (including those
active defense sensors that can aid attack operations) .
Passive defense "reduces the probability of and minimizes the effects of

[TBM]

attack by limiting an enemy's target acquisition capability, reducing the

vulnerability of critical forces and supporting infrastructure , and improving the
potential to survive and resume operations after an attack.,,12 The very
limitations that cause regional aggressors to rely on

TBM

forces may tend to

decre ase the utility of some classic passive defense measures such as the use of
decoy targets and
poor

CEP are

EMCON. Hostile

systems with long range, large warheads and

most likely to be fired against large, fixed, are a targets such as ports

and airfields; and they are more likely still to be simply launched against cities as
terror we apons attacking politic al centers of gravity.
Passive defense dire cted against an enemy's limite d battle damage assessment
capability, or used to enhance dissemination of early warning to civilians, has
more promise. Dispersal, mission-oriented protective posture
measures against

WMD,

(MOPP)

p assive

inoculation of personnel against bio-agents, and

temporary fortification of military facilities and individual units c an be
accomplished through training, doctrine, and habit. 23 By their very nature ,
military formations are acculturated to the basic practices of passive defense, and
thus are resilient and survivable if properly e quipped and well-le d. The same
may not be said of urban civilian populations. Aggressors know this, and "soft"
population centers are thus attractive as

TBM

targets.

Such D ouhetian thinking is borne out by the results of Global Wargame '95
at Newport, Rhode Island, and Wargame 95B at the National Test Facility,
Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. B oth examined maj or hostile

TBM

effortS

directed against nonmilitary population centers. In a regional conflict, then, the

CINC

might

well

reap

significant

benefits

through

multinational-force

coordination of passive defense efforts for population centers on his theater
Defended Assets List

(DAL) .

"It is critical t o plan for and disseminate

14
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[theater missile] launch warning and impact area pre diction to civil authorities,
as well as coalition forces . . . . Th e theater CINC and his subordinates sh ould
consider assisting the h ost nation civil authorities in e stablishing passive defense
24

measures for the civilian p opulation.,,

Th e defining characteristics of TBMD p assive defense thus include:
•

The vital importanc e of intelligence and e arly warning. Th e specific
capabilities of the threat must be well understood in order to plan effe ctive
passive defense measures. I mplementation of those measures in a timely
manner (and with a minimum of false alerts) requires effective e arly
warnIng.

•

Despite an understandable propensity on the part of military commanders
to concentrate on the maintenance of their military c ap abilities and the
welfare

of their

p ersonnel,

political

realities

may well

shift

that

concentration toward provision of passive defense for thre atened civilIan
populations.
•

Early warning of a TBM launch and a determination of the likely target are
relatively easy to obtain . Presently , it is harder to disseminate this
information quickly , effectively, and j ointly.

I ntelligence, early warning, and information dissemination are vital to
effe ctive p assive defense. A key enabler, th en, for this pillar of TBMD is the
capability which also supports active defense and attack operations, the plinth
beneath the pillars: battle management command, c ontrol, communications,
computers and intelligence.
BMC4I for the TBMD battle encompasses far more than issues of command
and control. It is inde ed an " architecture," a commander's "system of systems."
BMC4I seeks to overcome the greatest difficulties of TBMD-distance (great)
and time (little)-by integrating focused intelligence c ollection, e arly warning,
sensor cueing, defensive system response , and assessment of system effectiveness.
As TBMD systems and c ap abilities evolve toward 2008, the BMC4I core
concept of integration becomes critical , much more than just a m atter of
semantics. Under the necessary developmental discipline imposed by the need
for joint TBMD operations, more and more systems are achieving a degree of
interop erability, either through initial design or by means of " gateways" added to
older systems. " Interoperability suggests a compatibility of communications
means and message formats. I t produces a capability to share information
directly." 25
This is constructive but strictly evolutionary. The NAVCENT p ortion of
lessons learned from the maj or TBMD training exercise Roving S ands 95 reads,
in part : "We are still a long way from true interoperability. . . . We are not sharing
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data, merely conducting communications, passing tracks and overlays . . . and
26
As envisioned for joint TBMD, BMC4I seeks to achieve

providing correlation.,,

the revolutionary seamle ss battle space implied by true integration . Thus, in the
words of the Joint Staff: "Integration suggests more than just compatibility. It
suggests a decision to respond to shared information in accordance with
prearranged conventions and agreements. The net effect is a degree of synergy
27
which would not otherwise occur.,,
The characteristics of BMC4I for effective TBMD include :
•

An overall responsibility for comprehensive coordination of the TBMD
battle , from initial intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) to
interceptor kill evaluation and assessment of damage to protected assets
following TBM attack;

•

The need to disseminate TBMD surveillance and warning data derived
from national technical systems in such a way that time-critical defensive
operations in theater are supported, while national technical capabilities
are not compromised;

•

A fundamental importance to the exe cution of TBMD active defense,
attack operations, and passive defense ;

•

The pivotal obj e ctive of achieving a "system of systems" for TBMD which
is truly integrated, allowing automated exchange of data between joint
TBMD components in a seamless manner (design requirements of the
proj ected joint planning network, joint data network, and joint composite
tracking network reflect this goal) ; and,

•

A daunting degree of complexity which currently presents the most
massive and difficult technical challenge of any dimension of theater
ballistic missile defense.

Present Cap ability
The international tendencies and trends that demonstrate the need for
capable theater ballistic missile defenses are compelling, as is the historical
evidence of that n e e d stemming from DESERT S TORM. H owever, b efore
examining the TBMD -related issues of concern to a Joint Forc e Maritime
Component Commander in 2008, it is necessary to establish " ground truth :' a
brief, accurate description of where U. S . active defense TBMD capabilities stand
now. If a regional contingency involving a TBM-armed, WMD -capable
adversary were to erupt tomorrow, what active defense systems could U. S. forces
bring to the fight?
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Baseline

TBMD

Active Difense Capability. "Today, the nation's existing TBM

defense capability rests with the Patriot system and its evolving improvements.,,28
In the numerous exciting reports of ongoing

TBMD development, it is easy for

the seagoing operator to become confused by the whirl of programs and
budgets,

COEA studies , R&D pilot ventures , operational tests and evaluations,

battle group workups , "future studies;' and wargaming simulations. Thick
briefing books and lengthy slide presentations show a plethora of systems in
advanced stages of development, either being tested or awaiting further funding.
There is , however, only one active defense weapon ready to go to war n ow, and
that is Patriot

(MIM- 1 04) .

Patriot was conceived as a mobile, all-weather air defense missile, with the

XMIM-1 04 design spe cified in 1 965 . 29 TBMD capability was not available until
the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability 1 (PAC-1 ) in 1 988. PAC-2, the
Patriot version that earned fame in the Gulf War, was not deployed until

DESERT SHIELD in 1 990. Thus, the current version of the MIM- 1 04 is a
product-improved variant of an interceptor designed thre e dec ades ago.
Since

DESERT STORM, the missile has been modified twice, first under the
Patriot quick resp onse (QR) program (1 99 1 -1 992), and more recently through
the introduction of Patriot PAC-2 GEM (guidance enhanced missile) in
February 1 995. "We will field about 350 of these missiles, which will provide the
principal improvement in our defensive capability until the Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 begins deployments . . . .,,30
Patriot is an area-defense weapon, intercepting TBM s in the terminal phase of
their traj ectory, well inside the atmosp here, and engaging the m with a
proximity-fuzed blast-fragmentation warhead. This type of system has inherent
limitations against

TBM chemical submunitions , a critical c oncern which drove

the selection of an entirely new missile, the extende d range interc eptor

(ERINT), using hit-to-kill technology, (or Patriot PAC-3. The very short
standoff range of PAC-2 intercepts also makes likely effe ctiveness against a
barometric-fuzed nuclear
long-range

TBM problematic, and destruction of very high-speed
TBM ree ntry vehicles imp ossible.

The system itself, consisting of headquarters, communications, and support
equipment, 4-cell launching stations
each with its own

(LS) organized into 8-LS fire units (FU) ,
MPQ-53 radar, and 6-FU battalions (1 92 missiles) , is

air-transportable, but n ot tactically mobile.3! Emplacement and relocation o(fire
units can be done expe ditiously, but Patriot cannot "fire on the move." In effect,
it is a [lXed point defense system for stationary targets.
Getting Patriot into theater takes lift. Lots of lift. Movement of a
battalion with one full missile reload takes
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units from Germany to I srael during DESERT STORM "re quired more than 5 0
C-5As, and be cause o f bed-down limitations and refueling requirements,
diverted over 1 20 sorties e ach day [through 4 8 hours] from other high prior ity
33
lift requirements.,,
Since regional deployment of Patriot means install a tion of U. S. military
equipment and personnel on foreign soil, such deployment is unlikely prior to
imminent hostilities, except in relatively developed theaters such as western
Europe or northeast Asia (e. g. , South Korea) . Even in such "TBM-r ich"
environments as the Arabian Gulf, political sensitivities may imp e de timely
deployment or reinforcement of this single U. S. TBMD active defense system.
TBMD

as a "System of Systems. " The relatively short range and limited mobility

of the Patriot PAC-2 restricts the n ature of active defense TBMD plans built
around this system. Current concepts feature "enclaves" provided for sp ecific
critical assets. "The comp osite envelop e, which is the collection of fire units
producing the protected envelope and the critical assets in the area under the
envelop e, is designated an enclave.,,34 Since DESERT STORM, interim TBMD
enhancement efforts have involved initiatives to expand the volume of Patriot
enclaves. Because the MPQ-5 3 radar out-ranges the MIM- 1 04 interceptor itself,
one way to enlarge an enclave would be to move fire units down-range (down the
likely threat axis) from the radar supporting them. The quick resp onse (QR)
program of 1 99 1 - 1 992 did just this , giving the system the ability to " deploy missile
launchers up to 1 2km from their associated fire-control radar, which enlarges the
35
defended area.,, However, given the absolute performance limitations of the
PAC-2 missile, further enhancements to the enclave concept have had to come
from other areas, such as improving overall system performance through
leveraging BMC4I and pursuing the synergistic effect of a "system of systems."
Enclave defense with range-limited weapons has always demanded a measure
of grit from warriors. In 1 77 5 , holding Breed's Hill outside Boston, Colonel
William Prescott considered the effectiveness of his smoothbore muskets, scant
artillery, and limited ammunition, and told the patriots commanding the
batteries, " D on't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." Today's Patriot
battery commander cannot fire until the white-hot meteor of a reentering TBM
streaks through the sky inbound to his enclave. At least Pre sc ott could see the
British coming for a long time. Early warning as to the size, nature, and
disposition of a threat increases situational awareness and thus the efficiency of
the defense. For the TBMD battle today, that warning come s from space.
Current TBMD space-based early warning depends on Defense Support
Program (D SP) satellites originally deployed to detect strategic ICBM launches.
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Th eir capability against small er TBMs with asso ciated lower signatures is limite d,
but has been e nhanced by USSPACECOM through th e implementation of the
ALERT (att ack and launch early report to th eater) system. "It is the operational
version of prototype TM [th eater missile] warning efforts developed by the
tac tical exploitation of national capabilitie s (TEN CAP) office under th e Talon
Sh ield program.,,36 ALERT and its th e ater-deployed derivative, JTAGS G oint
tactic al ground station) , pro cess information from multiple satellites viewing a
single launch , thus gaining "stereo DSP" data.
System software calculates tactical parame ters such

as

time, latitude, longitude and

altitude for comparison with known theater balli s tic missile profiles . . . . Identify
ing the missile by means of the profile allows . " a least-squares fit of observed alti
tude and downrange distance as a fun ction of time . . . . Loft can be added to the
fo ur-state fit as a fifth parameter to permit manip ulation of the profile in both alti
tude an d downrange distance."

The ALERT system can thus provide TBM launch time and e stimated launch
position (critical for attack operations) , probable missile type (which may have
spe cific en gage ability and warhead implications) , missile st ate ve ctors (for
midcourse prediction) , and impact point prediction (for efficient are a defense
and effec tive passive defense) .
ALERT, however, is part of the national tac tical event system (TES) , located in
proximity to many other national capabilities near Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Communications restrictions imposed by the need to filter other sensitive
national systems data carried on the same nets can re tard disse mination of
ALE RT fused data. The system can meet a warning goal of90 se con ds-but that
window represents elapsed time from sensor to CINC-not sensor to TBM D
shooter. Studies have shown that some enemy missiles may impact th eir targets
before the associate d ALERT cues reach the in-theater defensive asse ts that need
them. The operational BMC4I solution to this time lag is th e modular,
truck-mounted, air-mobile D S P theater processing node-JTAGS.
The JTAGS system can process, fuse, and disse minate information from up to
three D S P satellites (if its antennae can " se e " that many of the geosynchronous
sensors) . Two pro totypes are now operationally deploye d, one in Germany and
the other in South Korea. The contractor has an option for producti on of a
further five units. 38 JTAGS -pro cessed D S P information provided in theater to an
Army force proj e ction tactical operations center (FPTO C) can enhance existing
TBM D active defense capability by quickly determining which of several
enclaves may be threatened by a given TBM launch , forwardin g the cueing
information to th e corre ct Patriot information co ordination central (ICC)
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vehicle at the battalion level, and thence to the individual

MSQ-1 04 engagement

control stations (ECS) .
Though the

MPQ-5 3 radar cannot directly accept external cueing data, that is
a major goal of current TBMD BMC4I integration efforts. Exercises are ongoing,
espe cially involving AEGIS SPY radar data provided to Patriot via the Navy's
new cooperative engagement capability (CEC) . For example, one recent test
"was designed to show how

CEC could help defend Europe . . . . A total of 3 1

simulated 'Scud' missiles were 'launched' from locations in N orth Afr ica. The
launch and predicte d impact point of each target , together with 'very near
real-time ' control data, was calculated by
battery some 1 ,450km away.
such

recently

.

.

CEC and transmitted to [a] Patriot

,,39 What must b e b orne in mind , however, is that

.

demonstrated

c ap abilities

are

experimental

rather

than

operational . Again quoting CENT COM lessons learned from the recent Roving
Sands

95 exercise : "The inability to real time cue and coordinat e sensor data
MPQ-5 3 radars limits our effe ctiveness.,,4o

betwe en AEGI S SPY and Patriot

Implications oj the Baseline.

The implications for TBMD active defense failure

to move beyond this baseline are far-reaching. The procurement power of such
TBMD organizations as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMD O) and
the Navy's Program Executive Office for The ater Air Defense, PEO (TAD) , is
not in doubt; but ftscal constraint has been a significant factor in Department of
Defense program planning since

1 9 85 . Hence, in considering the state of U. S .

theater defenses against a n evolving threat, o n e must carefully consider what
James Edward Pitts has called the " consequenc es of not jUnding.,,

4!

Re garding Patriot during D ESERT STORM, t o paraphrase D r . Johnson: i t
wa s n o t the fact that it did i t s j o b well that amazes, but the fact that it d i d i t a t all.
The current system, especially when deployed with the latest guidance
enhanced missile (GEM) and supported by ]TAGS, will be quite capable against
that same baseline threat. However, as the first section of this chapter explaine d ,
the

"baseline

threat" i s inexorably evolving beyond t h e Patriot

PAC-2

engagement envelope, pushed by two great TBM trends: increasing b allistic
missile system range and the frightening c ap ability of weapons of mass
destruction.
Increasing theater ballistic missile ran ge (which can b e achieve d by decreasing
payload, adding stages, or simply strapping on additional b o osters) increases
reentry velocity. Baseline defensive systems with limited standoff range , such as
Patriot PAC-2, rapidly reach a point where they cannot acquire, track, launch ,
and achieve intercept quickly enough . The kinematics o f the att acking missile
have gotten inside the O O DA loop of the defending interceptor. Such absolute

20

Theater Ballistic Missile Difense from the Sea
physical limitations can only be overcome by fielding a different system; this fact
has compelled development of
such as SM2 Block

IVA

PAC-3 ERINT

and even longer range systems

Navy Area, Army THAA D (theater high altitude area

defense) , and the very long-range Navy Theater Wide

(NTw,

using the SM3

missile) system. None is a substitute for another ; all are complementary
comp onents of an evolving active defense family-of-systems.
In addition to providing robust capability against long-range, high-speed
systems, or shorter range, high-apogee (lofted traj e ctory) TBMs, exoatmospheric
TBMD systems such as

THAAD and NTW provide

an essential capability against

weapons of mass destruction, which-to repeat-baseline systems do not. Even
a highly lethal area defense hit-to-kill design such as

PAC-3 will cause the release

of some WMD components into the air upon intercept consummation. Only
the Theater Wide defense systems have the ability t o make the kill in spac e ,
forcing any surviving WMD materials to careen into t h e atmosphere unshielded.
Theater Wide systems also extend the battle space, a primary goal of any
commander, while the baseline system does not; indeed, the current baseline
system surrenders not only battle space, but also vital intelligen c e to the enemy.
The fixed enclaves and point-defense limitations of
which asse ts on the

DAL

the

CINC

PAC-2

announce clearly

intends to defend, and thus, conversely,

which he is willing to sacrifice.
The

CINC

may not even be able to make that admittedly difficult choice

expeditiously, for p olitical sensitivitie s may constrain his ability to emplace
TBM D asse ts before the onset of hostilities. Once conflict commences, strategic
lift sensitivities could inhibit his ability to re actively deploy active defenses even
more. "When a crisis o c curs, the real-time decision to devote scarce airlift assets
to move a Patriot battalion instead of infantry or artillery e quipment will be
difficult and pressing."<Z
If the TBM threat continues to evolve , then j oint TBMD capability must
progress beyond the baseline. In the milit ary world, as in the natural world,
over-specialization is an invitation to catastrophe. A robust response to an
evolving threat requires diverse capabilities fully integrated through a common
BMC4I architecture. During the crucial early days of a regional contingency,
when "the Navy kicks open the door and holds it open for the heavy land
forces:' the

TBMD

active defense capabilities most likely to be picked from that

diverse palette by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be
naval. <3 If the us. military moves resolutely beyond the baseline, the JFMCC will
have flexible, deployable, multitiered n aval

TBMD

capability available by 2008 .

The proj ected charact eristics of those specific systems are the subj e c t of the next
section.
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Naval TBMD Active D efense Capabilities to 2008
" The N avy TBMD system shall be comprised of two tiers, which provides for
an Area Oower tier) defense and Theater Wide (upper tier) defense. Th e N aval
TBMD system shall provide capability against the full range of TBM threats for
protection of joint forces, sea and air lines of communications, command and
control facilities, vital political and military assets, supporting infrastructure, and
population c enters.,,44 N avy Area TBMD will be provided by the SM2 Block IVA
interc eptor, while Navy Theater Wide

(NTW) will likely depend on the SM3

missile, carrying an infrared-homing kinetic warhead. Sensor c apability will be
built around the AEGIS-organic SPY radar, with off-bo ard cueing from
JTAGS-type fused DSP data. Because of the highly automated, highly integrated,
self-contained nature of modern warships, much of the framework for the
projected j oint TBMD BMC4I architecture is already in place on AEGIS
combatants. As stated in chapter I of this study, it is presumed that the
architecture will be fully functional by 2008.

Navy Area TBMD. The SM2 Block IVA interceptor represents the latest stage in
the remarkable evolution of the Navy's standard missile, a weapon whose roots
reach back to the TARTAR and TERRIER offspring of the BUMBLEBEE antiair
warfare program of the 1 9 5 0s. N avy Area is one of the Ballistic Missile D efense
Organization "core " TBMD systems , and thus (along with Patriot PAC-3 ,
THAAD, and Navy Theater Wide) has a great deal of developmental and
bureaucratic momentum. A contingency cap ability of two Navy Area AEGIS
cruisers with at least 35 SM2 Block IVA missiles will put to sea by the end of the
S
century. 4
The Block IVA missil e itself i s a boosted, high-mach, long-range, solid-fuel
interceptor with "dual mode" terminal homing (IR primary and semi-active

RF secondary) and a blast-fragmentation warhe ad spe cifically enhanced for the
TBMD role. The combination of precise guidance (which increases the chance
of a direct " skin-to-skin" hit or very near miss) with a powerful explosive
warhead makes this interc eptor extremely potent.46 Proximity-fuzed, it therefore
does

not

suffer

the

one

maj or

drawback

of kinetic-energy hit-to-kill

systems-their all - or-nothing gamble on flawless guidance and successful
terminal homing.
Like Patriot PAC-3 , SM2 Block IVA will be multimission cap able, lethal
against cruise missiles and manne d aircraft in addition to TBMs. However, as
shown during Roving Sands 95 , its " defended footprint " will be far larger than
that of PAC-3 , allowing a rudimentary layered defense using only "lower-tier"
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systems if Patriot is in place in a littoral enclave. Against a simulated
600km-range TBM , a Navy Area e ngagement at 1 20km is p ossible many more
times than is a PAC-3 intercept against the same target.47 Maximum intercept
altitude, which is critical against WM D warheads, is also c onsiderably great er, at
35 km-a height of over 1 1 3 ,000 feet.4s Addition ally, it should be n o ted that for
short-range TBMs with ap ogees (highest point of ball istic trajectory) within the
atmo sphere , Navy Area will be the only naval active defense system capable of
engaging, because the Navy Theater Wide SM3 interc eptor functions outside
the atmosphere.
Such figures, however, need to be evaluate d carefully. The defended fo otprint
of any area defense TBMD interceptor de creases as the velocity of the incoming
TBM target increases. Ballistic missile terminal velocity is a fun ction of system
range ; so the lon ger the range of the enemy syst em, the smaller the area that can
be defended by lower tier systems. For example, against a 900km-ran ge TBM,
Navy Area engagement range drops to 65km, or approximately thirty-five
nautical miles-ranges familiar to shipboard operators of early fle et AW SM2
.
9
vanants. 4
The thoughtful reader must beware of oversimplification. The conc ept of a
" defended footprint"-in effect a Navy Area enclave-represents a complex
geometry dependent on many factors , in cluding TBM range an d relate d
terminal velocity, radar cross-section (ReS) , an d the spatial relationship between
the AEGIS ship and the asset it is defending. Furthermore , in a littoral
environment, Navy Area systems will have to provide greater coverage than
equivalent groun d-base d systems because of the p rosp ect of a shoal-water
"buffer" be tween the TBMD ship an d the DAL target it is defending. Are a
defense systems generally benefit from collo cation with the asse ts they are
defending, but it oft en will be difficult for a Navy Area ship to patrol in
proximity to the asset it is assigned to protect. Until groun d-based systems are
emplac ed in theater, Navy Area ships will need all the reach they can get to
"hold op en the door."
Well forward, defending an amphibious obj ective are a or other military assets
against short-range TBM thre ats, that inlan d Navy Area "reach" will be
considerable. Defending political or population targe ts far from the main
military engagement , however, not only takes multimission ships an d tethers
them to single targets; it also markedly shrinks the fo otprint area and
engagement altitude of their defended envelope s against just those hostile
systems (long-range TBMs) most likely to be employe d with WMD, weapons
which tend to negate the value of close-in point defense. This long-range ,
politically targeted WMD-cap able thre at po stulated for 2008 drives the n e e d for
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another layer of protection to complement the versatile, capable, but limited scope
of Navy Area. That seagoing "upper tier" capability is Navy Theater Wide.

Navy Theater Wide (NTW). Interception of theater ballistic missiles outside the

atmosphere using Theater Wide active defense systems is fundamentally
different from the more intuitive "goalkeeping" defense accomplished by lower
tier systems. Conceptually, it may be helpful to think of Theater Wide defenses
as being akin to long-range CAP engaged in the classic AW outer-air battle, with
area defenses fighting the close-range battle within the battle group's missile
engagement zone (MEZ) . As with C AP aircraft, the area defended by an NTW
ship depends more on the location of the defensive platform than on the
location of the defende d target.
Rather than an enclave-like defended footprint surrounding a single target,
NTW involves an "area ofnegation" within which a single AEGIS ship can patrol
in order to intercept TBMs en route from a hostile launch area to many different
friendly targets. Herein lies the tremendous leverage of NTW, and the
explanation for TBMD briefing slides that show a handful of NTW ships
defending all of southern Europe or all of Japan from TBM attack. The
kinematics of the NTW interceptor have eliminated the need for these ships to
be collocated with single defended assets. Instead, the ships are positioned either
somewhat forward in large areas of negation that allow multiple exoatmospheric
midcourse and descent-phase intercepts in support of hard-pressed area defense
systems, or well forward, where they can exercise the upper tier capability
unique to the Navy Theater Wide system-ascent phase intercept.
Ascent phase intercept is the holy grail of naval TBMD. The only active
defense technique that can possibly exceed its leverage is boost phase intercept
(BPI) , attacking TBMs while the missiles are still acc elerating away from their
launchers. Boost phase systems and doctrine remain primarily in the Air Force
corner of the joint TBMD arena. Ascent phase active defense, by contrast,
engages the strengths of NTW AEGIS combatants, which can patrol in
international waters off a hostile shore, with their Spy radars looking inland,
awaiting (but not requiring) a DSP cue. As soon as a launch is detected and ROE
are met, an NTW interceptor can be on its way to destroy the TBM as soon as it
rises above the atmosphere.so Such a proactive capability produces a defe nded
area covering tens of thousands of square miles.
The only TBMD weapon that will do this is the SM3. Only four inches
longer than the SM2 Block IVA, the SM3 missile is actually a four-stage system,
starting with the Mk72 booster and Mk 1 04 solid rocket motor it shares with the
Navy Area interceptor. " The inertially guided, nozzle-controlled advanced solid
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axial stage (ASAS) [Now " TSRM " for " Third Stage Rocket Motor"] motor will
constitute the third stage . . . . The fourth stage wilJ be the autonomous LEAP
KKV [Kinetic Kill Vehicle] .,,51 Guidance technologies used in this extremely
long-range system include missile command uplink, inertial, GPS, and infrared
terminal homing. The kinetic warhead

contains no explosive charge.

(KW)

Maneuvering autonomously with thrusters, it homes on the IR signature of the
hot TBM revealed against the cold vacuum of space, closing for the kill at several
times the velocity of th e fastest rifle bullet. The kinetic energy of a moving
obj e ct equals one-half th e object's mass times the square of its velocity. Thus the
small but

very fast KW packs

a serious kinetic punch. When c ombined with the

squared inbound velocity and much gre ater mass of the incoming TBM, the
energy released in th e intercept c ollision is tremendously destructive. If that
TBM is c arrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear payload, the components are
shattered and dispersed outside the atmosph ere.
The potential c apability of this system is so significant that challenges to its
development have proven to be not only technical but political . There h as been
considerable controversy surrounding the potential effect of NTW on the 1972
Anti-Ball i stic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Again , though , it is necessary to review the
numbers carefully. When considering Russian strategic systems, " I CBM speed of
6-7 km/ sec easily outdistances the 4-5 km/ sec of the interceptor, precluding an
ascent phase intercept. If an AEGIS ship is near the terminal target of the
I CBM-by th e time an interceptor can be fired and flown out to intercept, the
RVs [Reentry Vehicles] are below the minimum altitude of the exoatmospheric
hit to kill vehicle .,,52 Consequently, while the SM3 is potentially extremely
capable against medium range ball i stic missiles, it is not c apable of effe ctively
engaging the high-speed reentry vehicles of a strategic I CBM.
The eventual influence of modern theater ballistic missile defense te chnology
on a treaty involving strategic defense signed nearly a quarter c en tury ago is still
being hotly debated, but naval TBMD active defense development is c ontinuing
apace and could be available as currently envisioned in 2008. "Both the Navy
Area TBMD and the Theater Wide c apability have been certified by the
D epartment of Defense to the Congress as fully treaty c ompliant.,,53

Sensors.

The primary sensor for naval TBMD active defense will be the AEGI S

SPY r adar. The TBM -tracking capabilities of Spy are b eing explored and
expanded through the use of non-tactical data c ollection (NTDC) software
"patches:' experimental modifications that will lead to a tactical TBMD -capable
program version. Thus modified, S py radars h ave " demonstrated the ability to
track TBMs at ranges well in excess of 500km
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As with any radar, tracking range is highly dependent on the radar cro ss
section (RCS) of the target, and Spy autonomous range s again st more
challenging TBMs will decrease accordingly. Here, battle space can be regained
through cooperative tracking by two AEGIS ship s, the forward "picket " linking
tracks to a con sort downrange until the second ship can acquire the target. This
capability has been demon strated in several TBMD extended tracking exerci se s,
including Joint Task Force QTF-95) demon stration s of the new Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) , the pre sent-day precur sor to the joint compo site
tracking network po stulated for 2008 . JTF-95 test s included "a CEC cueing and
compo site tracking of a TBM target, initially detected by USS ANZIO's SPY- l
radar just after launch . . . . Other CEC units . . . were all automatically cued to
acquire the target within seconds. Each maintained a single composite track on
"
the target until it splashed down."
Cooperative tracking again st low-RCS target s can also be enhanced by
stationing ship s off-axi s from the threat traj ectory. Multiple aspects of the TBM
are thus illuminated by the Spy radar s of more than one ship. What might be a
very challenging target head-on may give a useful return from it s beam aspect.
The compo site data shared via CEC take s advantage of this phenomenon and
thus provide s all platforms in the network with the be st possible track on the
target TBM.
Battle space can be gained not only through sharing track data between
radars, but also by using the RF energy of any given radar more efficiently. Spy
must search for and detect a TBM before it can acquire and tran sition-to-track. If
radar waveforms and anticipated search volume can be "fine-tuned" early for
TBM detection, Spy can acquire and track much faster, thus gaining time in the
all-important TBMD OODA loop. Off-board cueing is the key to efficient radar
management and early detection.
In 2008, cueing to AEGIS will be primarily a USSPACECOM function via
theater-based JTAGS, cONUS-based ALERT, and the third component of the
tactical event system, the Navy'S Radiant Ivory-derived TACDAR (tactical
detection and reporting) capability. The Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander must therefore bear in mind that "as friendly operation s shift in
time and place, the T[B]MD planner must continually reevaluate the areas to be
covered by DSp, and effect continual coordination with USSPACECOM to
56
obtain that coverage.,, He must remember, however, that these sen sors are in a
geosynchronous con stellation and are therefore far out in space. Any
modification to th e geometry of that constellation will therefore involve many
mile s of satellite repo sitioning, with the associated consumption of limited
thruster fuel. It will also take time. The need for stereo DSP coverage should be
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established and agreed upon in the initial TBMD planning process, rather than
when enemy launches commence.
A significant limitation of national overhead sensors such as the DSP
constellation is an inability to gather data on TBMs after boost phase, when the
hot plume of the rocket motor no longer exists. This cueing gap will not be fully
remedied until the space-based infrared system-low earth orbit
(SBIRS-Low)-is deployed (pending full funding) . Even then, since SBIRS-Low
is by definition a low-earth orbit system, it will have periodic, multipass coverage
rather than the continuous "staring" coverage given by a geosynchronous sensor.
Without post-boost information, lTAGS-type data will be suffi c ient to support
searc h volume limitation and waveform selection for SPY, but will not meet
criteria for an optimum single beam cue, "an uncertainty volume small enough
to be covered by a single beam of a Fire Control Radar system.,, 57
The importance of post-boost-phase sensors for supporting single beam Spy
cueing has been clear to the Navy for several years, as shown by the work of
Robert Powers, advocating the adaptation of infrared search and track (IRST)
equipment to the E-2C aircraft. 58 Airborne IR systems can continue to track a
TBM after its motor burns out by sensing skin heating of the missile body caused
by the friction of its passage through the atmosphere. The E-2C/IRST concept
was first known as Gatekeeper. 59
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W

HAT, THEN, ARE THE TBMD ISSUES

with which the Joint Force

Maritime Component Commander must specifically conc ern himself?

When considered in light of proj ected u.s. naval capabilities and anticipated
regional threats ten years hence, areas of useful concentration for his particular
attention coalesce around four key topics. These are :
•

Logistics

•

Command, Control, and Intelligence

•

Warfighting

•

Rules of Engagement

Logistics will b e dealt with first, since this subject clearly illustrates the value
of a straightforward operations analysis approach in order to b ound an important
discussion-a discussion which, when so bounded, reveals imp ortant caveats
regarding the true complexity of war in the littoral, an arena of conflicting
missions prose cuted with limited me ans.
Command, control, and intelligence follows logistics, and c onsiders that same
complexity at three separate levels of leadership : above the

]FMCC at the NCA

level; among compe ting c omponent commanders at the theater level; and from
the

]FMCC down to the unit level. Encompassing all levels, comprehensive
the ]FMCC's
mastery of the subtleties of the TBMD mission, and thus his ability to make the
intelligence preparation of the b attle space is held to be essential to

hard choice s necessary for its effective execution .
The section on warfighting derives its arguments directly from the debates
illustrate d in the pre c e ding pages, setting forth some of those hard op erational
choices which will inevitably face the

]FMCC as a result of his own logistical
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constraints and the operational intent of his sup eriors. The contrasting but
complementary capabilities of Navy Theater Wide and Navy Area TBMD are
thus considered.
Finally, the essential issues of national policy and international law that must
inform U.S. TBMD operations are presented below in a section on rules of
engagement. As the final portion of the core chapter in this study, this
consideration of the legal dilemmas and the inherent uncertainty with which
the JFMCC must wrestle p erhap s represents an allegory, a cautionary tale, for the
whole topic of theater ballistic missile defense delivered from the sea.

Logistics
With the general background provided in the preceding chapters, the reader
is in a position to anticipate the issues that will c onfront the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander. For simplicity, this section will begin with
the most straightforward: the physical characteristics of on e 's own force and an
operations analysis-type approach to the issues that arise. The JFMCC must be
fully cognizant of the key capabilities and limitations of his own forces. In
preparing for the theater ballistic missile defense mission , one of his primary
concerns must thus be logistics , e sp ecially the unique stresses TBMD will place
on the vital tasks of refueling and rearming his AEGI S combatants.

Iron Logic of Fuel:

CG

versus

DDG . In a rapidly developing conflict against a

TBM -capable foe , the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may find
himself cast as the JFC 's Leonidas, holding the pass at Thermopylae as the Persian
arrows rain down , buying time for reinforcements to arrive in theater. If the
limited naval theater ballistic missile defense cap ability initially available in
theater is likely to be overmatched by sheer numbers of hostile missiles at the
outset of a fight, then that capability must be used both effectively and efficiently.
One of the strengths of modern U.S. naval c ombatants, and esp ecially AEGIS
ships, is their multi-mission versatility. Costly, complex, and capable, these ships
excel at the "up, out, and down" missions of AW,

SUW

and

USW Their role

potent TLAM strike platforms was critical during DESERT S TORM: by

as

2008 ,

naval theater ballistic missile defense will be a major new AEGIS mission. The
TBMD battle, however, is unlikely to take place in isolation-thus it will have to
be c onducted in both competition and coop eration with the other impor tant
missions given to the maritime comp onent of the Joint Force, as its ships, aircraft ,
and Marines stand fast and secure the rapid buildup of land and air power in
theater.
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The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must use his highly
capable but numerically limited AEGIS asse ts wisely, both in how he apportions
them for a variety of missions and how he assigns them different tasks within the
TBMD mission. Different ships and different missions are not created equal. For
example, NTW brings more to the fight than N avy Area. I f, however, enemy
TBMs are short-range and low-ap ogee, this is a moot p oint, for they wilJ not be
engage able by Theater Wide defenses. Nonetheless, the highest leverage hostile
systems will generally be those with the longest range, able to reach out and
touch political targets, able to threaten the p olitical c enters of gravity of coalition
cohesion and national will-to-fight.
NTW counters this threat and counters it efficiently, by fielding a system with
kinematics that all ow TBM engagements in the asc ent phase, during midcourse,
and during descent before the endgame of area defense systems. One NTW
platform can thus defend many targets on the DAL. Therefore, when faced with
a robust enemy TBM order of battle and an ad hoc defense by whatever naval

TBMD capability is currently deployed in theater, the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander should seek to maximize the NTW p ortion of the
naval theater b alli stic missile defense mission .
If p ossible, the JFMCC needs to get his NTW-capable AEGI S ships close to the
enemy TBM launch areas and keep them there. Herein lies the rub. Both AEGIS
cruisers (CG 47/52 class) and AEGIS destroyers (DD G 5 1 class) could, by 2008 ,
be equipped t o perform the NTW mission. But which ship would be more
effIcient at a task which is, in effect, an antimissile deterrent patrol in a distant,
perhaps isolated, NTW are a of negation? A straightforward op erations analysis
approach may prove useful.
In a hypothetical contingency, an AEGIS cruiser and destroyer are steaming in
company with the CV and the AOE, having just refuelled to 1 00 percent
capacity

(98 p ercent available) . They are b oth ordered to proceed at 25 knots to

separate NTW patrol areas, both 1 ,000 nautical miles distant. Up on arrival, they
are each to patrol at quietest sp eed in accordance with their class combat systems
doctrine, until they re ach a fuel state of 5 0 p ercent, with contingency
authorization to remain on station to 30 percent fuel. An escorted AO will refuel
them on a regular RAS circuit until they are relieved by other NTW units.

All ships have unique fuel consumption curves, and consumption rates will
vary with sea c onditions and degree of bottom fouling; but using the generic
data contained in Class Tactical Manuals,60 the CG 47 Class Combat Systems
Doctrine ,61 and a recent unclassified message from the AEGIS Program Office,62
basic fu el consumption comparisons between the two AEGIS classes can be
made. They are instructive.
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After a 1 , OOOnm sprint, the cruiser can remain on station at 1 3 knots for 6
days to 50 percent fuel, with a load on the electrical plant sufficient to keep Spy
radiating at high power. Shifting the main plant to the nonstandard
configuration low speed quiet mode (by following classified information in the
combat systems doctrine) should boost endurance to 7}12 days at 5 knots. If the
decision is made to drop to 30 percent fuel, on-station time is 1 0 days at 1 3
knots, and just over 1 2 days at the low speed quiet mode 5 knots.
Note the reason for the high 1 3-knot patrol speed. The cruiser, like most U.S.
twin-screw combatants with controllable reversible pitch propellers, is most
quiet with both shafts powered and both props at 1 00 percent pitch. The
Prairie/Masker system must also be aligned in accordance with the specific
classified parameters in the class combat systems doctrine. Below 1 00 percent
pitch, the props cavitate. The slowest speed the cruiser will normally make at
1 00 percent pitch on both shafts is between 1 2 and 1 3 knots. Low speed quiet
mode achieves improved quieting, lower speed, and greater fuel economy, but at
the cost of a nonstandard plant configuration that takes engineering control
away from the bridge watch team.
Under the same conditions, the endurance of the DDG is strikingly different.
Patrol time to 50 percent is just under 3 days at 13 knots, with about 5}12 days total
to 30 percent fuel state. The DDG 5 1 class combat systems doctrine does not yet
detail a low speed quiet mode configuration for the class; but if a setup similar to
that for the cruiser is presumed, then endurance to 50 percent would be boosted
by a day, and to 30 percent by 2 days, maintaining a patrol speed of 5 knots. Thus, at
the lowest speed and lowest fuel state, the cruiser can remain on station more than
1 }12 times as long as the destroyer. At a more responsive 1 3 knots and a more
responsible 50 percent fuel state, the cruiser will have lasted twice as long as the
destroyer-and will have done it with 35 percent more VLS cells.
While this simplistic arithmetic shows the logic of selecting the cruiser for
the NTW mission, it also helps to highlight one of the JFMCC's greatest logistical
challenges: the iron logic of fuel. Warships have redundant weapons, redundant
sensors, and plenty of manpower. When the fresh fruit and vegetables run out, a
Navy ship's galley can still serve macaroni and cheese well into the next century.
Fuel, however, is an absolute. Empires were built around coaling stations for
good reason, and the NTW cruiser captain who finds himself at 30 percent fuel
in the face of the enemy is not going to sleep well.
To fight the theater ballistic missile defense battle efficiently, the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander should favor Navy Theater Wide systems, if
he can. But in order to defend the DAL and also be prepared to establish an
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amphibious obje ctive are a, he will also have to retain Navy Area assets for both
endgame TBMD defense and conventional AW
By the very geometry of their missions, NTW and Navy Area assets will tend
to be widely separated, as they are best employed at opposite ends of a ballistic
trajectory that may extend for hundreds of nautical miles. Under the umbrella of
layered defense that they provide, other ships will go about other essential
missions-and they will all need fuel.
The days of the amphibious ready group and carrier battle group moving
about the theater as near-contiguous blocs of military power and logistical
organization have been over for some time, but the unique time-distance
stressors associated with theater ballistic missile defense have the potential to
overwhelm current ad hoc logistics solutions to dispersed tasking. Recent
events, such as those involving AEGIS combatants in the Adriatic or
UN-sanctioned maritime interdiction forc e (MIF) board-and-search operations
in the northern Red S ea, have seen the frequent use of allied replenishment
at-sea assets and unescorted U S. auxiliaries. Examples include everything from a
Canadian Forces oiler fueling the Red Crown AEGIS CG off Montenegro to a
lone USNS T-AO rotating down to Hurghada, Egypt, to support the MIE In
future contingencies involving TBMD, allied or coalition logistical support is not
initially guaranteed and thus may not be counted upon to augment US.
replenishment capability in theater at the very moment US. naval TBMD assets
may be spread farthest and thinnest.
Even as the theater develops, the fuel problem will remain challenging. In the
Phase 2 (day 70) portion of the 2005 + scenario ofNTF Wargame 95B, eighteen
TBMD-capable AEGIS combatants ranged the length and breadth of the
Mediterranean and Aegean seas, esc orting three CVNs, performing TLAM
strikes and local AW, and conducting NTW and Navy Are a patrols.63
Replenishment was not simulated.
If the enemy TBM effort against the defended asset list develops in a mann e r
not anticipated by the jFMCC's initial resource allocation, then TBMD assets may
have to be shifted rapidly, with the resulting full-power sprints consuming even
more fuel. Knowing this, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
must carefully evaluate his ability to carry out a robust, flexible TBMD plan while
still providing his ships with sufficient fuel for safe operations and combat tasking.

VLS Capabilities and Limitations: Reload and Loadout. A warship cannot live
without fuel, but it cannot fight without ammunition. As weapons systems
become increasingly complex and specialized, the ability of a weapons platform
to exe cute a given missIOn is increasingly tied to its reserves of a spe cific
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munition. I f the AEGIS CG demonstrates superior enduran c e for the remote

NTW mission , that advantage is squandere d if the ship carries an insufficient
loadout of NTW interceptors.
If all its SM3 missiles are gone after two days on-station, the CG's superior fuel
reserve s are rendered irrelevant . Except as a sensor or cueing platform, the ship is
usele ss for NTW and is probably out of p osition for any of the o ther missions it is
potentially capable of performing. Furthermore , unlike fuel, VLS reloads cannot
b e provided on station . The ship must leave its patrol area and proceed to port,
perhaps taking itself out of the fIght entirely.
As originally designed, the Mk4 1 vertical launching system and its variants
have a nominal underway replenishment capability. The practical limits of this
capability are suffi c iently great that in the late 1 980s, the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA) studied a series of p ossible improvements. The results of that
study, driven

by the

the emerging

old S oviet regimental raid threat, are still relevant in light of

TBMD mission.

Looking at older ship classes, CNA found that " typical rate s for the transfer of
large missiles between ships at sea [were] on the order of two t o six missiles p er
hour."" In re gard to

VLS, "limited t esting of the VLS UNREP system indicates

the fleet can expect about 3 missile s per hour as a consistent strike-down rat e in
calm seas (sea state 3 or less) ., ,65
However, the two most important

VLS munitions in the current inventory,
SM2 Block IV, cannot be transferred at sea at all, since they are
several thousand p oun ds too heavy for the launcher-inst alled VLS h andling
crane. This problem first became a maj or issue during DESERT STORM, when
hundre ds of Tomahawks were launched in a matter of days, and entire VLS
Tomahawk and

magazines had to be reloaded in theat er.
In the

TLAM strike world, standard operating procedures were developed,

tested , implemented, and finally incorp orated in detail into the NWP
series (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

(TLAM-C/D )

3 - 03 . 1

Employment Manual) .66

Referring t o

TLAM rearmament procedures while discussing TBMD is
TBMD
missile size and weight are similar. The Mk 1 4 VLS canister for TLAM and the
Mk2 1 c anister for SM2 Block IV and its variants (including S M 3) are the same
size , and while TLAM will probably remain the heavier of the two missiles,
encanistered weights are within 1 ,000 Ibs. of e ach other.
instructive primarily b e cause the logistical challenges of Tomahawk and

NWP

3- 03 . 1's

rearming site requirements are cle ar:

Rearming requires pierside handling facilities, airfields and airlift capability (lower
volume and higher expense) , seaport and sealift capabilities (slower, higher vol
ume, and lower expense) , and trucking from seaport or airfield to pierside .
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ordnance-certified m obile crane with a "power-down" mode having sufficient
rated capacity, boom length and hook height may be used to load. . . . QR [Quick
Reaction] teams may also be used to support loading and unloading operations at
anchorage with a barge and floating crane or cross-decking operations with a de
stroyer [tender] . 67

How many tenders, both AD and

AS, will the Navy actually have in 2008?
VLS ships such as AEGIS

Also left unstated is the fact that "double-e nde d"

cruisers and destroyers can be rearme d twice as fast if two cranes are available (a
frequent bone of contention at stateside weapons stations) . With both cranes
swinging canisters and enough forklifts and pier-side han dlers to ke ep up with
them, a motivated

AEGIS crew can completely reload the ship 's VLS systems in

one (long) day. Note the optimum requirements, though : a pier of sufficient
length and with water alongside to accommodate ships up t o

5 63

feet long and

32 + feet in draft; cranes , forklifts, trucks, and/or flatbed rail rolling stock; and
contiguous or near-contiguous cargo ports or airfields. Such a facility is precisely
the kind of "logistics node" that the JFMCC will be attempting either to defend
or seize early in a regional conflict. When in friendly hands, such a facility is a
prime TBM target in its own right, as seen at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on
February

1 99 1 ,

16

when an Iraqi Scud impacted within yards of an ammunition

pier berthing seven ships , a supply barge, and the

USS Tarawa .68

Logistics for supplying the rearming site itself are daunting. If airlift is used to
expedite

VLS reloading, more than four dedicated C5 sorties will be needed to
AEGIS CG with TBMD and TLAM munitions. 69 What must
be b orne in mind, though, is that the AEGIS ship thus reloade d c an the n protect

fully rearm a single

that same airfield in order to allow the 1 28 C 5 sorties required to move a Patriot
battalion into theater.7o Furthermore , the Joint Force Comman der will still be
confronted with the reality of c ompeting missions, only one of which is TBMD.
The logistical chall e nge s associated with rearming

VLS c ombatants in theater

clarify the reason that current CONOPS tend to state that follow-on loads of
VLS munitions will arrive in the magazines of deploying c ombatants. If VLS
reloading or load "tailoring" via cross-decking will thus be difficult in an
engaged theater of operations, then the initial loadout with which a VLS

AEGIS

ship departs home port is crucial to the combat effectiveness of that ship.
By 2008 , there will be over

5 , 5 00 VLS

cells arming the

AEGIS combatants of
SM2 Block IVA, SM3, 4-missile
packs of Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) , vertical launch ASROC (VLA) , Tomahawk
TLAM-C and 0 variants, and perhap s SM4 Standard load attack missiles.
Only one of these missiles, the Navy Area SM2 Block IVA, is a true
the fleet.71 Competing for this finite space will be

multimission weap on , with capability against aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater
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ballistic missiles. With single -mission weapons , however, initial VLS loadout is a
zero-sum game. For every missile loaded to support Mission

A, Mission B

Ioses

capability.
One of the historical strengths of naval forces has been their ability to carry
out a variety of missions. The maritime component is versatile, flexible, mobile
and survivable, an adaptable "force package " for the JFMCC to task as require d.
There is thus a strong institutional prejudice toward mixe d-mission loadouts for
VLS AEGIS ships. These combatants were designed and built at great expense to
do many missions and to do them all well . Furthermore, the true nature of any
regional contingency seldom becomes clear before battle is j oined. If maritime
forces are to be first on the scene, then they must be capable of responding
immediately to a variety of hostile challenges.
This is all true-to a p oint. Mixed loadouts are appropriate, but the theater
CINC and the officers he may potentially task as Joint Forc e Commander and
JFM CC should use peace time intelligence preparation of the battle space as a

tool to best match loadout to potential tasking for combatants
deployment. By

2008 , this will

prior

to

be come a far more complex process than that

which determines the current , common

70/30

loadout split between SM2 and

TLAM.
For example, if there

is a significant long-range

TBM threat in theater which

can be leveraged by forward-positioned NTW, then consideration should be given
to increasing the SM3 load percentage in AE GIS CGs deploying to that theater.
The "Chinese puzzle" problem of shuilli ng VLS canisters around the battle group
could be solved by shifting the TLAM and Navy Area missiles thus displaced to
AEGIS DDGs, which in turn would be tasked with the brunt of potential Navy
Area TBMD and strike missions. Every AEGIS combatant would retain the
multimission Navy Area interceptor, but would otherwise "load the dice" with
the single-mission missile best suited to a given ship type and the unique
challenges of a particular deployment in a particular theater of operations.

Command, Control, and Intelligence
Issue s of command and control contrast with issues of logistics because C2
doe s not answer easily to the rational p ower of numbers. Considered in isolation,
logistic al

problems

lend

themselves

to

mathematical

solutions,

to

the

computational clarity of operations analysis. This is not true of command in war.
Van Creveld writes: "S o far, I have spoken of command as if it were solely a
rational process (or rather, a combination of processes) in which information is
use d to orch estrate men and things toward performing their missions in war.
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This is not stric tly true, however, since war is an irrational business par
exc ellence."n A significant danger when studying any new and evolving form of
warfare is to be seduced into oversimplification, into generalized forc e -on-force
comparisons,

into

enumeration

of technic al

ch aracteristics

rather

than

ope rational c omplexities. Th e purpose of discussing TBMD command, co ntrol,
and intelligen ce issues is to muddy the waters upon which the pre ceding
logistical arguments float, and thus prepare the reader for the complex realities of
warfighting that follow.
The e xercise of efficient and effec tive command and control in war finds its
counterpart and helpmate in the d ecision-th eory art of "satisficing,,,n a
dynamic, ever-evolving cycle of demand an d compromise which attemp ts to
counteract the fog of war by resolving internal conflic ts. These may be conflicts
of mission, conflicts of tasking, c onflicts of rank, conflicts caused by l ack of data,
or even c onflicts stemming from information overload. Th e co mman der who
exercises effec tive command and control is the c ommander who can best resolve
the inc essant tension be tween conflicting missions an d limited means, a tension
which is inherent in all military operations.
This tension will affect the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander at
three levels: above him, at the JFCICINC/NCA level, where theater ballistic missile
defense will be highly visible ; at the theater level, where the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander must work out initial TBMD plans in competition with
other missions and prepare for the eventual shift of the AADC and/ or JFACC roles
ashore ; and at the individual unit level, where the JFMCC must balance the
importance and visibility of the TBMD mission with the distinctly limite d
number of naval platforms and interceptor missiles initially pre sent in theater.
The reso lution of these tensions asso ciated with competing taskin g and levels
of command must take place under the rubric of mission, the overall in tent of
the CINC and Joint Force Commander. Finally, the pote ntial impac t of th eater
ballistic missile defense on that mission can only be evaluat ed through the
rigorous

exe cution

and

thorough

understanding

of the

TBMD -related

intelligence preparation of the battle sp ace (I PB) .

Political Nature of

TBMD:

C2 up the Chain of Command. The asymmetric

power granted an aggressor through possession of TBM capability elicits an
asymmetric response from those thre aten ed by that power. Th e hundre ds of
ScudCap missions flown over the western desert of Iraq dur ing DESERT
S T ORM , the redeployment of Joint Special Operations Command

aSOC)

special mission assets, and the dozens of C5 sorties flown to support a
rudimentary TBMD are a defense capability for I srael stand as testimony to this.
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In 2008 , the captain of an NTW-capable AEGIS cruiser positione d for
ascent-phase intercept off the North African littoral could well find his single
ship defending many of the capitals of southern Europe against attack by nuclear,
biological, or chemical-capable TBMs. 74 This de gree of threat , and the potential
leverage of a single ship against that threat , will resonate up the chain-of
command in a way that the conventional air warfare mission never has. The Joint
Forc e Maritime Component Commander must anticipate both support and
interference commensurate with that resonance. How he deals with this
inevitable phenomenon will directly affect his ability to support the Joint Force
Commander, both with theater ballistic missile defense and with the other
essential missions under his purview.
The

netted

battle

management

command,

control,

communications,

computers, and int elligence (BMC4I) architecture assumed for a 2008 scenario

will be vital to the efficient execution of the the ater ballistic missile defense
mission, but will inevitably affect the freedom of action of every level of the
chain of command, making each subject to the guidance of all levels above,
delivered in real time. Nelson could not have gotten away with h olding his long
glass to his blind eye if First Sea Lord Sir John Jervis had been sitting at a joint
maritime command information system QMCIS) terminal in Whitehall.
Indeed, to chafe at such c entralized oversight has been an identifying trait of
naval c omponents throughout history. In the joint context, however, and
espe cially in regard to j oint theater ballistic missile defense, centralized,
high-level "meddling" is both inevitable and underst andable, for theater ballistic
missiles are uniquely "political" weapons and have been so since the first V-2s
smashed into the streets John Jervis once walked.
In the simplest terms, the mission of theater ballistic missile defense forces is
to s afeguard areas on the theater defended assets list (DAL) as prioritized by the

CINC and Joint Force Commander. It is instructive that at National Te st Facility
Wargame 9 5B, whose TBMD portion simulated the defense of southern Europe
against a WMD-capable TBM threat from the Levant and North Mrican littoral,
the first priority on the DAL was the regional national capitals target set,
followed by major friendly population centers, with the defense of military
targets a distinct third. Similarly, in the Global '95 game, limited NTW assets
were completely exp ended in the Northeast Asian MRC defending the
population centers of an essential ally at the direction of the National Comman d
Authority.7s These game results acknowledge the primacy of political c enters of
gravity in the TBM target set. The Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander must b e prepared to deal with the consequences.
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Military forces possessing unique capabilities related to political centers of
gravity tend to see their command and control architectures "stovepipe " toward
centralized control by the National Command Authority. S trate gic nuclear
forces assigned to the Unite d S tates S trat egic Command (USSTRATCOM) or
special mission units assigned to the Joint Spe cial Operations Command aS OC)
of the United S tate s Special

Operations Command (USSO COM)

come

immediately to mind. Naval forces have traditionally been re sistant to such
centralized consolidation of control, as seen in the debate over the balli stic
missile submarine force dur ing the post-Cold War creation of USSTRATCO M ,
the preservation of a degre e of naval special warfare aut onomy within
USSO COM, and, during the years that nuclear Tomahawk was deployed, the
designation of that weapon as "tactical"-thus keeping the ships and submarines
carrying it under Navy control.
To this day, naval doctrine espouses flexibility and individual initiative based
on a clear understanding of mission . Inde e d , Naval

Doctrine Publication 6, "Naval

Command and Control:' cites historical precedent and states:
Armed with an understanding of th eir senior's intent , the s ubordinate command
ers were expected to conduct a wide range of operations on th eir own initiative.
This style of command has been an enduring characteristic of naval op erations
and continues to distinguish the way naval commanders exercise command and
control to day.7.

While acknowledging the spirit of independent initiative that lies at the soul
of the naval service, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must
grapple intellectually with the fact that modern command and control
technology will inevitably erode that independence. In the specific arena of
naval TBMD, especially high-leverage Theater Wide defense, that erosion will be
accelerated due to the overarching political importance of particular targets to
be defended. NTW assets may well come under the direct control of the Joint
Force Commander, the CINC, or even the NCA; and as a theater mature s, the
]FACC and AADC may well be consolidate d-potentially putting those same
ships at the beck and call of an Air Force general ashore.
The details of such command relationships represent n ovel arrangements for
b oth the Joint Forc e Maritime Component Commander and the surface Navy.
The potential of naval TBMD is so great , though , that conventional notions of
naval autonomy must be respe cted only insofar as they bring to b ear the
maximum effect of these new capabilities. As with o ther naval assets of
rec ognized political or strategic importance, such as ballistic missile submarines
since

their

introduction

and

carner
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corrunanders

of naval

surface

assets

may

well

have

to

adjust

familiar

arrangements to cope with new challenges. Theater ballistic missiles represent
such a challenge in our age, a challenge which may require development and
acceptance of new corrunand and control relationships for maritime forces. To
do otherwise is to risk marginalizing key naval capabilities in future conflicts.
The degree of c onnectivity and consultation demanded by the NCA for the
theater ballistic missile defense mission may well exceed that now associated
with sensitive special operations and peacetime TLAM strikes. When tasked as
Area Air

D efense

Corrunander, the Joint

Force

Maritime

Component

Corrunander will be responsible to the Joint Force Corrunander for TBMD
active defense plans. These plans will have their basic grounding in the
theater-specific TMD CONOPS, which in turn will be based on j oint doctrine
and j oint CONOPS.
CONOPS are by their very nature quite general, and plans, by ne cessity, are

specific. The ability to articulate the plan up the chain of comman d will be an
essential skill for the Joint Force Maritime Component Corrunander if he is to
preserve a degree of autonomy. Spe c ific TBMD knowledge above the theater
level may well be based on CONOPS , leading to a constant c horus of se cure
SATCOM and teleconfe rencing in search of clarification and detail. The Joint

Forc e Maritime Component Corrunander cannot avoid this, and should not
attempt to forestall it by flooding unsolicited detail up the chain in a preemptive
attempt to remain unfettered. He must plan for an ongoing, interactive dialogue
unique to this particular mission , a dialogue perhaps best handled by a dedicated
TBMD cadre on his staff.
Much as in special operations or TLAM mission planning, a small team set up
as a dedicated node of corporate knowledge at every level of the chain of
corrunand can facilitate understanding and clarity of purpose, and decrease
confusion and rep etition when discussing the mission in real time. If the Joint
Force Maritime Component Co mman der can thus aggressively and lucidly
detail his plan and his progress up the chain , he decreases the very real risk that
he will be bypassed down the chain by the NCA giving rudder orders directly to
the captain of an NTW AEGI S cruiser.

Competing Missions: C2 at the Theater Level. During an

emerging crisis in an

undevelope d theater, facing a TBM-armed, WMD -capable adversary, the Joint
Forc e Corrunander may assign duties as both Area Air Defense Commander and
Joint Force Air Component Commander to the Joint Force Maritime
Component Co mman der. If substantial U. S . Air Force assets are already
positioned in theater, the JFACC could well be separate, although the Joint Force

40

Theater Ballistic Missile Difense from the Sea
Maritime Component Commander might retain Area Air Defense
Commander responsibilities due to his force's naval theater ballistic missile
defense capability and mobile, survivable, carrier-based air power. As operations
progress and the theater matures, the cycle may be completed by the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander relinquishing Area Air Defense
Commander duties to the JFACC ashore. The point of these permutations is
simple: if the JFMCC is likely to be the pivotal component commander in the
crucial early stages of a conflict involving theater ballistic missile defense, then he
must pay particular attention to the complex relationship and competing
operational prerogatives of the Area Air Defense Commander and the Joint
Force Air Component Commander.
When facing theater balli stic missiles, the moment of greatest danger occurs
early in the conflict, due to the likely mismatch of offense and defense. The
enemy TBM inventory will be at its maximum, while U.S. theater balli stic
missile defense assets will for the moment be limited to those deployed in
theater, unless a lengthy (and unlikely) pre-hostilities period has allowed an
unopposed friendly force buildup. "Naval TBMD provides the earliest capability
just when the heaviest TBM attack intensity is likely, and when other TBMD
systems are still en route or present only in small numbers.,,77 Such a "window of
vulnerability" starkly highlights the confli cting missions of the JFACC and
AADC, a conflict which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
must be able to resolve. 78
The basic dichotomy is that of offense and defense. The nature of modern
offensive operations drives air planners to seek diverse target sets that have a
synergistic effect when struck simultaneously (e.g. , local C2 nodes in
combination with a regional power grid) . The goal is to enhance c ombat
effectiveness by conducting parall e l operations to the full depth of the theater,
shocking the enemy with a pulse of power rather than by incremental attacks
delivered sequentially. In pursuit of decisive concentration, this style of
operation demands a certain " critical mass" of aircraft and cruise missiles in
order to bring an adequate weight of metal to bear on enough targets in a
suffi c iently short period of time. The Joint Target Coordination Board and the
Joint Target List are e stablished to ensure the optimum employment of this
critical mass.
However, in the operational circumstance where the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander is most likely to be designated as JFACC and Area Air
D efense Commander, available strike assets will by definition be limited,
primarily to the aircraft on the one or more carriers in theater, and the
Tomahawk inventories in the VLS magazmes of their escorts. These same
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VLS -capable comb atants will be desperately needed t o redress the early the ater
ball i stic missile defense window of vulnerability, as will be JFACC-controlled
TBMD attack operations sorties.
The j oint target list and the defended assets list will thus b e set in opposition
to each other. It will b e up to the triple-hattedJFMCC/JFACCI AADC to cut this
Gordian knot while simultane ously discharging traditional naval component
missions such as SLOC protectio n , CV e scort , maritime interdiction force (MIF)
operations, USW; MIW; and protection of MPS assets as they arrive in theater. The
challenge is accentuated

by

the inevitability of limited assets and exacerbated by

the improbability that these diverse tasks will be geographically compatible for
any given placement of the force asse ts.
Strike

units

and

those

co nducting

reconnaissance

and

USW I MIW

sanitization of pot ential amphibious objective areas will tend to b e well forward.
NTW assets

will patrol large "areas of negation : ' TBMD launch baskets covering

thousands of square miles, dynamically determined and continuously reshaped

by

automated planning tools evaluating enemy TBM disposition , capability, and

an optimum defended footprint .79 Units protecting the DAL as Navy Area
platforms will be restricted to rigidly limited patrol areas as goalkeeper for a
particular targe t. Ships conducting escort and logistics support missions must be
able to range the full depth of the theater.
The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is unlikely to have
enough ships, aircraft , and VLS c ells to fully service the joint target list , provide
initial defense-in-depth to the DAL, and prepare both his forces and an AOA for
power projection operations ashore. He must , in effect, continually prioritize
and subject to risk analysis all of his subordinate missions as JFACC, AADC, and
Maritime Component Commander in order to best support the overall intent of
the Joint Force Co mman der.
The JFMCC must be utterly forthright in assessing his own capabilities and
evaluating the tasking given him from above. If theater b allistic missile defe nse is
a priority, and his forces are spread too thinly over the DAL, he must call for
either more assets or a reduction in the defended target set .
To this end, a precise delineation of mission , from the CINC through the Joint
Force Commander to the JFMCC, is essential, so that the Maritime Component
Commander may rec oncile his conflicting responsibilities through a clear
statement of co mman der's inten t . That statement also will provide guidance and
continuity when and if the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Area
Air Defense Commander duties shift to other service components later in the
campaIgn .
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Some of the lessons thus incorporated are directly applicable to the NTW
nusslon.
At le ast one re al-world TLAM contingency mission in recent ye ars would
h ave faile d if assigned to a single ship. Last minute combat systems casualtie s
were operation ally overcome by the use of a mutually supportin g backup
shooter, who successfully fired the mission. The same principles apply to
high-leve rage , high-visibility NTW tasking. If the ship designated to engage
cannot ge t the shot off-for whatever re ason-a second cruiser sharing the
TBM track via the ]CTN can respond immediately in accordance with

established AEGIS TBMD

doctrine

and

thus preserve

as much

of the

interc ept/kill evaluation/refire decision time line as possible.
With so much potentially riding on NTW, the ]FMCC should give serious
consideration to the TAG team concept. The extra assets c ommitted may
dramatic ally increase the likelihood of mission success.
Amphibious Objective Area Pro tection : USMC Concerns. While the unique

characteristics and challe nge s of Navy Theater Wide defense help illustrate the
central TBM D theme of resolvin g conflicting missions and limited means, Navy
Area defense must not be neglected. It is a c omplementary rather than an
inferior capability, and it is essential to the pivotal TBMD tene t of layered
defense. In specific areas of the Joint Forc e Comman der's operational concept
and intent, it may indeed dominate TBM D planning. Amphibious operations
represent just such an area.
As DESERT STORM demonstrate d, amp hibious assault is not nec essarily
required for successful power projection against a littoral objective . I ndeed, as
critics of the Marine Corps never tire of pomting out, a maj or opposed landing
has not been attempted by U.S. force s sinc e Inch on, which by 2008 will have
rec eded more

than half a century into history. H owever, th e suc cessful

conclusion of conflict will often require the introduction of ground forces onto
hostile territory, and those ground forces will increasingly require protection
from both air-breathing threats (e. g. , aircraft and cruise missiles) and ballistic
missiles, protection which Navy Area ships can provide until land-based systems
are in place to shoulder the defensive burden.
I n a perverse twist of operational logic, the gradual spread of TBMs and
p ersistent proliferation of we apons of mass destruction may in fact revive the
utility of some types of amphibious op erations. One of the centers of gravity
which WMD tend to hold at risk is the power proj e ction forc e itself. Large,
relatively fixe d, l and-force buildup s, such as took place in S audi Arabia prior to
the beginning of the DESERT S T O RM ground war, are clearly vulnerable if
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The TAG concept, however, has operational value that is greater than the sum
of its parts for reasons that go beyond mutual defense and enhanced TBM
engagement.

The

mun dane

realities

of required

maintenance,

systems

limitations and real-world reliability are equally imp ortant.
The essential sensor for n aval TBM D engagements until well into the next
century will be the Spy radar. Versatile , capable, and reliable, various versions
will have been in service with the fleet for more than twenty years by 2008 . Like
any complex sensor, though, Spy requires maintenance. The p rimary radar of an

AEGIS ship is not brought on lin e at the beginning of a deployment and secured
six months later. The systems test officer (STO) on a cruiser would like a few
hour s out of every seventy-two with the radar down for maintenance. Various
"work-arounds:' such as shutting down the forward or aft arrays only, and then
maneuvering the ship to ensure coverage of the likely threat axis, are possible ;
but these are stopgap measures, and the system will eventually degrade.
Thus , if a single ship is assigned to an NTW patrol area, the JFM CC is
confront ed with a simple but serious dilemma. In order to remain fully mission
capable, Spy must shut down periodically. Whenever it does, a p ortion of the

DAL is put at risk for the duration of the maintenance p eriod. Furthermore, if
the NTW ship is optimally stationed well forward, an adept enemy may well
detect the moment that Spy secures and thus be able to exploit the resulting
window of vulnerability of both the DAL and the ship itself.
The cruiser has redundant systems which will decrease its own vulnerability,
such as the SPS-49 air search radar, EW and chaff systems, CIWS, Harpoon, and
the SPQ-9 radar incorporated in the Mk8 6 gun fire control system (GFCS) .
Good technicians, given warning, can also bring Spy out of maintenance
quickly. However, the timeline of TBMD engagements is so challenging that
even the most agile combat systems team may not be able to bring the radar back
up and generate the required high-power waveforms quickly enough once a

TBM launch is remotely detected and cueing data is passed to the ship.
Two ships in mutual support can decrease the impact of both planned Spy
maintenance and the inevitable, unexp e cted component failures which occur in
even the best maintained complex combat systems. Additionally, the redundant
radar coverage thus provided will allow continuous NTW coverage during
evolutions such as LAMPS launch and recovery, and underway replenishment, all
of which require temporary degradation of Spy coverage by the ship involved.
Finally, the concept of a backup shooter for critical launch operations has
been validated for years by TLAM CONOPS. TLAM pubs such as the NWP
3-03 . 1 series serve as useful exampl es of how a related mission has been
exhaustively analyzed and addressed in light of actual operational exp erience.
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available

for

horizon

search

and

other

functions.

This

is

not

a new

phenomenon-but the unique demands of TBMD tend to exacerbate the
problem. A Navy requirement for TBMD enhancement of the AEGIS c ombat
system

is

the

ability

to

perform

TBM

engagements

and

self-defense

concurrently; but TBM tracks will still require a significant perc entage of total
radar energy and processing power.
The human factor must also be considered. If a given NTW ship is responsible
for the defense of a dozen key political targets and population centers on the
DAL, all threatened by the WMD-capable missiles of a b ellicose re gional p ower,
the attention of the CIC watch team will understan dably gravitate toward the
TBMD mission . If it does not, vociferous SATCOM consultations between the
JFMCC and the cruiser CO will make it so. Training, doctrin e , and deckplate
professionalism can resist-but probably not overcome-such tactical tunnel
vision . Under these circumstances, it will be prudent t o have a heavily armed
partner helping with the close-in threat.
The scouting and U SW capability inherent in the dual helicopter SH-60
LAMPS detachment organic to each cruiser, plus LAMPS HAWKLINK, the j oint
data net, TBMD cueing from space-based sensors, and the track-sharing
capability of the CEC-derived JCTN, will allow effe ctive mutual support from
well over the horizon. The lower the non-TBM threat, the more this baseline
can be lengthened. Such separation of TAG platforms allows extended
cooperative tracking of TBMs, as shown in the RED TIGRESS test of 1 9 9 3 ,94 the
USACOM JTF-9 5 TBM exercise in August 1 9 94 and cooperative engagement
capability workups of the Eisenhower battle group,95 and more recent PACFLT
extende d tracking exercises during 1 99 5 . 96 The resulting incre ased tracking time
will facilitate multiple NTW shot opportunities and improve the timeline for kill
asse ssment. If, for some reason, space-based TBM launch cueing is not available,
cooperative tracking by NTW ships will be vital in order to pre serve an
engagement window constrained by the time lost between TBM launch and first
detection by the forwardmost Spy radar.
Looking toward 2008, evolutionary advances in enemy TBM technology will
likely reduce reentry vehicle radar cross-section. Cooperative tracking by NTW
ships on a widely spaced baseline can help overcome the RCS challenge posed
by more advanced high-b allistic-coefficient (" skinny and p ointy") separating
RVs, by simultaneously radiating multiple aspects of the target and using a track
derived from the strongest return. Such a capability also helps hedge against the
eventual deployment of penetration aids on more advanced TBM systems and
will facilitate kill assessment against any TBM following interc ept.
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prep ackaged in discrete units-ships. With a limited number of ship s available in
the ater, and a limited number of potential reinforcement s to bolster them, the

JFM CC must constantly weigh the relative leverage a given mission allows him
against the numb er of ships required to ac complish that mission.
In a force-on-force analysis, Navy Th eater Wide TBMD capability often
app e ars to give th e JFMCC great leverage , with a single ship defending multiple
targets on the DAL. That leverage, thou gh , must be tempered

by the

real-world

complications of other warfare areas and multiple hostile threats, the impact of
systems reliability issues, and

the

concomitant

requirement for

systems

maintenance even in the fac e of the enemy.
That said, the defensive leverage ofNTW remains an d is p oten tially so gre at
that the JFMCC may wish to consider p rovi ding a robust, survivabl e capability
thro ugh the use of de dicated, mu tually sup porting asse ts, a TBMD Action
Group (o r TAG Te am) . Such a conc ept i s re ally a spe cialized mar itime versi on
of th e generic B allistic Mis sil e Defense Organization construct of the active
defense group (AD G) , " c omprising relatively autonomous package s of both
sensors and shooters . . . . I n general, th ese AD Gs were assumed to po ssess all of
the capabilitie s re quire d t o detect, acquire, track, e ngage, and kill ho stile
mi ssiles.,,93
The advantage s that accrue when two NTW ships are assign ed to a single
NTW patrol area are signiftcant. Intuitively obvious is the doubling of VLS
inventory an d th e potential for mutual support in a multithreat environment.
Additionally, if continuous NTW defensive coverage is to be guaranteed, the
vital issues of systems maintenance an d equipment casualties can be dealt with
meanin gfully

only by

two identical platforms operating in concert.

The NTW mission is best carried out in proximity to the enemy. A littoral fo e
suffic iently advan ced to field long-range TBMs can probably comprehend th e
significance of Spy radar emissions detected by his coastal EW site s. Depending
on the nature of the aggressor and the charact eristics of the operating are a,
threats posed in oppo sition to an NTW cruiser could include diesel submarine s,
ASCM -armed fast patrol boats, mine s, shore-based AS CMs , strike aircraft, or even
unconventional stratagems such as special operations force s deploye d from
merchant ve ssels, fishing craft, minisub s or fast motorbo at s. As in aerial combat,
diverse chall e nges can best be met by two platforms c overing each other while
exe cuting the primary mission.
Secondly, the advantage s of mutual support are define d not only by the nature
of th e threat , but also by the nature of the sensors criti cal for TBMD. SPY radar
energy is a finite quantity. As more and more of it is " sque ezed" into th e
speci alized waveforms re quired for TBM detection and tracking, less will be
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Decreasing the inherent friction between NTW and strike will re quire the
close cooperation of the AAD C and the JFACC, respe ctively responsible for
TBMD and TLAM operations. If these duties all devolve upon the JFMCC early
in the conflict, so much the b etter, one might say, for this would all ow unity of
command to fo ster unity of effort. A "first-cut" on the degree of mission overlap
can be achieved by comparing the most likely TLAM launch baskets with the
most likely NTW areas of negation as established by the Tomahawk mission
distribution system theater mission library, peacetime intelligence preparation of
the battle space, and the automated TBMD planning tool resident in the JPN. If
these expanse s of ocean are mutually exclusive-in effect, Venn diagrams which
do not overlap-then strike evidently will be a dedicated mission perhaps best
apportioned to a mix ofDD-963 and DDG-S 1 comb atants, with NTW tasked to
CGs. Ideally, these cruisers will have been loaded out with a re duced TLAM VLS
cell count in order to increase th eir SM3 capacity.
If, h owever, there is significant launch b asket/are a of negation overlap, the
AADC and JFACC have something to work with and can attempt an
acc ommo dation. For example, how is the DAL affe c t e d if NTW ship s patrol
only that p ortion of an are a of negation which overlaps TLAM launc h
baskets? How c an th e JFACC adjust Tomahawk missions s o that t h e size o f
those laun ch baske ts is incre ase d to give maximum coverage o f N T W patrol
are as?
If NTW ships can still patrol effectively within a TLAM launch area, the
JFACC and his Tomahawk strike co ordinator can maximize the utility of such
TLAM as remain in the cruiser VLS cells by assigning these ship s strike missions
which allow large launch baskets. TLAM mission profiles which use GPS
primary guidance, or which do not require enhanced time-on-target control or
precision strike Tomahawk (PST) capability, and which do not require
maximum range flight past the first preplanned wayp oint (FPPWP) , tend to
increase the size of the useable launch basket .92
Neither strike nor NTW can be considered in isolation. When their
distinguishing sources of friction Oaunch baskets versus areas of negation) are
rigorously comp ared, areas of friction can p erhaps be resolved into areas of
overlap, with multimission capability thus enhanc ed. The JFMCC must ensure
that a comprehensive, cooperative comparison of mission characteristics and
operational objectives is made , both at the theater level and by his subordinate
commanders.
TBMD Action Group (TAG) Concept for NTW. The Maritime Component
Commander's means to carry out a variety of missions come to him

50

Theater Ballistic Missile Difense from the Sea
In a theater where the TB MD mission will be leveraged by both NTW and
Navy Area, logistical considerations of endurance and magazine capacity will
cause the CG to b e favore d for NTW t asking. Reduc ed radar cross-section and
improved track processing in the littoral e nviro nme nt provided by the
SPY-1 D (V) radar may cause the DDG to b e favored for the AOA support role. For
this mission, the DDG's lack of organic helicopter capability is offset by the
ability to provide support and an agile staging deck for the diverse rotary wing
assets of the ARC. The DDG's less robust fuel endurance, which could be a
crit ical liability on detached NTW patrol, may be of no consequence when
operating with the battle group in the CV escort role. Both classes of AEGIS ship
are versatile, powerful, and highly cap able . Th e JFMCC and his battle group
commanders must constantly review the overall intent of their taski ng and
ensure that class-spe cific capabiliti es are focused to best effe c t .
Whe n p otential friction is inherent i n a missi on rath er than b eing a
by-product of platform characteristic s, the JFMCC must look more closely.
Two cr iti cal missions that will con flict regardless of ship type will b e N TW
TB MD

an d

TLAM

str ike .

Both

re quire

ships

forward-positioned

in

circumscrib e d laun ch are as, an d b oth re quire dedicat e d , c o mpeting VLS
capacity. Friction thus exists at th e outset and must be re solve d by the JFM CC
an d his subordinate s.
This inevitable operational friction betwe e n strike tasking and NTW defe nse

will be severe. The improved WDU-36 warhead fitt ed to the Block III TLAM-C
is still only a

1 ,000

lb. - equivalent weapon and is therefore most effec tive in

massed strikes by one or more ships, potentially using a significant portion of
their available VLS capacity. Launch timelin es and time-on-target windows tend
to be rigorous in order to achieve maximum effect from a given "pulse" of
striking power. Thus, timely arrival in designated TLAM launch baskets is
critical, closely monitored by the JFACC and h is Tomahawk strike coordinator
(TS C) . The resulting ship-wide tactical focus on strike, from receipt of the first
IND IGO tasking message until th e last Tomahawk drops its booster and
transitions to cruise flight , does not contribute to the expeditious exe cution of
th e equally challe nging NTW mission.
Of course, th e impact of TLAM on TBMD can be ameliorated by maximizing
the use of D D-963 platfor ms as strike assets; but unless the conditions of the
conflict are extremely permissive, or enemy capabilities distinctly limite d, th e
Sp rnance-class destroyers will still re quire AW prote ction . Furthermore, by 2008 ,
the lead ship of this revolutionary class will have served for more than thre e
decades . Increasin gly, the prepond erance of the fleet's VLS capability will be
carr ied by AEGI S sh ips.
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and MIW For

NTW ships in far-forward ascent phase intercept areas of negation,

the capabilities of enemy fast patrol boats, coastal surveillan ce, maritime strike,
and shore-based

ASCM

batterie s must also be considered. For all

historical data regarding local meteorological impact on

Spy radar

AEGI S

ships,

propagation

and Navy Area interceptor infrared seeker performance should be included in
the planning process.

IPB

is iterative, a constantly evolving game of "what if?"

designed to reveal answers to issue s driven by enemy capabilities and actions.91
Comprehensive intelligence preparation allows the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander to better anticipate possible enemy courses of action
and to exercise effective command and control to counter them.

Warfighting
If the great strength of naval combatants lies in their innate ability to perform
many different missions, then one of the greatest challenges facing the Maritime
Component Commander will be to prioritize those missions in support of the
Joint Force Commander's operational intent, and app ortion his limited asse ts
accordingly. To do so, both effectively and efficiently, the

JFMCC

must have a

clear understanding of the operational capabilities and limitations of his
combatants, and the zones of friction which exist between their competing
IIllS Slons.

Reality of Competing Missions.

The degree of mutual interference between

competing missions varies with the protean nature of conflict. A

DDG providing

Navy Area protection to an amphibious obj e ctive area may also be able to support
Marines ashore with its 5 -inch gun, and fire

SM2 missiles to destroy enemy aircraft
DDG, tasked to provide Navy Area
coverage for a vital port while land-based TBMD systems are off-loaded and made
ready, may not be able to support the JFMCC with any other mission.
counterattacking the beachhead. That same

Such tradeoffs are difficult to anticipate and must be dealt with as operations
progress and requirements become clear. What operational planners can do in
anticipation of regional contingencies is to try to illuminate constants, "first
principles" of mission overlap and c onflict that do not tend to vary (or tend to
vary less) as the specifics of a given contingency change.
One such constant is the mission capability of different platforms. Missions
themselves are mutable , but ships and their associated systems are known and
quantifiable. Conflict and friction between overlapping missions can be
decre ased if an optimum match between platform and mission is sought.
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c ontrol engagements only under rare circumstances, such as defending against
known WMD.,,85
The theater ballistic missile defense plan should seek t o position NTW
shoot ers as far forward as possible to shorten the TBM-launch to first-interc ept
time line. NTW kill assessment will depend on "tactical telemetry in all missile
stages and recording of essential

AEGIS systems data. Additionally, it will include

telemetry of kill vehicle seeker imagery to the firing ship.,,86 Cons umma tion of
an NTW intercept can take several minutes. Developing a plan to take advantage
of early intercept opp ortunities will increase time available for kill asse ssment,
and decrease pressure on other units to launch.
Preplanned responses to a "positive-no-kill " determination should follow
sequentially in acc ordance with doctrine all the way to the area defense
endgame so that no TBMD shooter along the target's traje ctory is forced to
fire -by-default and thus chance wasting missiles. "Decisions could be based on
pre-established algorithms for maximizing engagement opp ortunities against
specific targets or for maintaining balanced inventories.,,87
If corre ctly designed and promulgated to TBMD units through mission-style
orders, th e Area Air Defense Comman der's theater balli stic missile defense plan
should be capable of execution with minimal dire ct intervention. The AADC is
then free to coordinate decentralized exe cution of the plan by remotely
moni toring remaining VLS inventories, observing the enemy level of effort
against the DAL, and realigning his forces as nece ssary as the battle progresses.

Intelligence Preparation of the

TBMD

Battle Space: "The days, weeks and

months preceding hostilities must be used to plan, prepare and organize for the
exe cution of TMD active defense, which is accomplished in terms of minutes
and seconds.,,·8 Execution of the theater missile defense intelligence preparation
of the battle space is the responsibility of the Area Air Defense Commander."9 If
the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is tasked as the AADC, this
vital work will devolve up on him to in clude the complex TBMD subset of
theat er missile defense intelligen ce preparation.
As comp onent commander for the th eater ballistic missile defense assets
likely to be first committed, the Joint Force Maritime Comp onent Commander
must use intelligence as a vital adjunct to enhance his ability to exercise effective
TBMD command and control. The Naval Doctrine Command cites five
elements comprising IPB :
•

Battle space evaluation defines the area of operations and focuses intelligence
asse ts on the battle space .
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duty, maritime interdiction force patrol, and TLAM strike may not be in position
for

either Navy

Area

or

NTW

tasking.

Finally, real-world

e quipment

performance must be taken into account. The demonstrated reliability of even
the best complex systems is somewhat less than
Thus, once

the Joint

Forc e

1 00

Commander

percent .

and Joint

Force

Maritime

Component Commander have c ompleted their initial appraisal of the Defended
Assets List and Joint Target List , and have decided what portion of the available
naval component can be dedicated to theater ballistic missile defense (or can
conduct TBMD tasking while executing other missions) , the

jFMCC

will find

his actual engagement capability to be much more modest. Whe n set against the
likelihood of a preemptive main effort by enemy TBM forces, the need for
rigorous fire discipline becomes obvious.
With individually guide d interc eptors such as SM2 Blk IVA and SM3, the
probability of kill, P k ' against an inc oming target does not vary directly in
accordance with the number of rounds in the air, as it would with VT-fuzed
" dumb" proj ectiles from antiaircraft artillery. Blackening the sky with missiles
may possibly boost Pk incrementally, but it will surely deplete VLS cells
drastically. The netted C2 architecture proj e cted for

2008

is c orrectly seen as the

key to a solution for this problem; but the Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander should refle ct carefully on how he chooses to use the capabilities
that the j oint planning net , j oint data net, and j oint composite tracking net will
give him.
The traditional naval response to limited SAM inventories has been close
control of the inner air battle-in effect circling the wagons and having the
Force Air Warfare Commander issue "take " orders. If the joint data net and j oint
composite tracking net are implemented as currently planned, the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander (as

AADC)

c ould conceivably do the same

for the theater ballistic missile defense battle. This is not the intent of the netted
C2 archite cture.
The TBMD battle is likely to be fluid, dispersed, an d sporadic, flu rries ofrapid
launches followed by varying periods of quiet, as TELs attempt to relocate ,
rearm, and hide from attack operations forces. Fluid conditions in battle are best
dealt with by tactical formations having good c ommunications, a thorough
grasp of doctrine , and mission-type orders that allow them maximum flexibility
in achieving coordinated decentralized execution of the comman der's intent. In
the context of theater ballistic missile defense, fire discipline must derive from
doctrine and planning rather than from centralized control by the Area Air
D efense Commander. "The

AADC

will invoke positive c ontrol procedures to
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Fire Discipline and Effective Difense : Unit Level C2. In future conflict, several
factors may mo tivate aggressors to use their TBM capability early. First is the
intuitively obvious theater ballistic missile defense window of vulnerability.
TBM D interc eptor inventory in theater is unlikely to be initially robust ,
espe cially when spread over a DAL encompassing political as well as military
targets.
The other significant motivator for early TBM use is a relic of strategic
deterrence theory-the threat of "use it or lose it.,,80 In the Cold War c ontext of
nuclear-armed ICBMs, the increasing need to launch quickly and early in any
given

exchange

was

dire ctly

proportional

to

the

enemy's

hard

target

" silo-busting" capability. In the context of TBMs, the equivalent of silo-busting
is attack operations, the pillar ofj oint TBMD that seeks out and destroys missiles,
transporter-erect or-launchers (TELs) , an d support vehicles on the ground.
Joint exercises such as the Roving S ands series show that much work remains
to

be

done

in

this

difficult

are a. However, evolving sensor-to-shooter

capabilities, new systems such as the pod-mounted APG-7 6 synthetic aperture
radar for attack aircraft,8! and geo-predictive databases such as GALE (generic
area limitation environment) ,82 developed and deployed by D IA, all show that
the relative immunity of the DESERT STORM-era S cud TEL is eroding quickly.
Any potential enemy with a fundamental grasp of the open literature will
appreciate that by 2008 , U. S. attack operations capabilities will pose a significant
threat to his TBM forc es. Thus , if the correlation of offense and defense will be
favorable to him before U.S. capabilities in theater can build up, and he
understands that attack operations will become increasingly effective as th ose
forces build up, he will be sorely tempted t o launch e arly and often .
The initial JFMCC force structure for the 2005 + phase of NTF Wargame 95B
showed an "AEGIS-rich" CVB G composition that included four DDGs and two
CGs per battle group. 83 A nominal VLS capacity for such a force is easily
determined. Credit 90 c ells to each D D G and 1 22 to each cruiser. Allow four
cells each for vertical launch ASROC, and apportion the remaining c ells 70
percent/30 percent for SM2/3 and TLAM. 84 This gives 6 0 available non-TLAM
cells in each DDG, and 82 in each CG. In a battle group with four DDGs and two
CGs, the grand total will be over 400 VLS cells available for air warfare (AW) and
TBM D missiles.
This is initially impressive, but delib erately simple-minded. Navy Area ships
must, in effect, be collocated with the DAL assets they are defending, while Navy
Theater Wide engagements are best conducted close to the TBM launch point
in order to attempt intercept in the ascent phase. Ships assigned the many other
missions of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, including escort
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they fall within the range of WMD-c apable TBM systems. Operational
maneuver from the sea can give the Joint Forc e Commander potential
alternatives.
A re cent RAND Corporation study of the implications of regional nuclear
proliferation states: "An overwhelming operational need is to engage the
regional oppon ent with forces that can operate effec tively from beyond the
en emy missile range or independently of fIXed bases;,97 Until the sea echelon is
in place and actually assaulting the AOA, TBMD-capable amphibious power
projection forces remain mobile, difficult to locate, and equipped for both active
and passive defense against WMD. Once the assault begins , tactical and logistical
agility are required on the part of the en emy in order to bring his WMD ass ets to
bear on the AOA; more importantly, he will have to make the political decision
to use weapons of mass de struction on an objective he is attempting to defend.
In some circums tances, then, the JFC may wish to employ operational
maneuver from the sea. To do so with confidence, he will require robust Navy
Area TBMD assets . The Navy's Director for Theater Air Warfare (N 865) has
written: "We must be able to force our way ashore even under the threat or
actual conduct of TBM strikes.,,98 In this context, the Marines are primarily
concerned with the threat posed by short-range systems such as FROG-serie s
artillery rockets, the SS-21 mobile SRB M , and the powerful Russian-built
SMERCH multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) .
Roving Sands 95 demonstrated both the active defense potential of Navy
Are a systems , 99 an d the difficulty of attack operations dire cted agains t the
sm all, fast-moving SS-21 's TEL /oo while the chall e nge posed by modern

multiple -launch rocket systems is so stre ssing that DoD has committed an

advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) to address this problem. !O!
Re cent U. S.lIsraeli initiatives to ac celerate development an d deployment of the
laser-based Nautilus anti-rocket defense system have shown promise. However,
until such syst ems and the doctrine for their e mployment are proven and
fielded,

the

solution

to

the

extende d-range

(70km) ,

course-corrected,

guided-submunition-capable SMERCH!02 probably lie s with enhanced attack
operations and will thus remain under the purview of the JFACC rather than the
Area Air Defense Commander. SS-21 and WMD-capable MRBMs targeted on
the amphibious objec tive area will remain important targets for the Navy Area
platforms supp ortin g the amphibious operation .
Because of their kinematics, systems such as the SS -21 (with apogees below
the minimum engagement altitude for SM3) are unlikely to be vulnerable to
Navy Theater Wide defense s. These shorter range systems, however, will enter
the SM2 Block IVA engagement envelope in the endgame . In
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defense of the

AOA against both manned aircraft and cruise missiles will b olster

the utility of the multimission

VLS

SM2

Block

IVA

interceptor and will thus favor a

loadout of Navy Area (and strike weapons, such as the SM4) for the

amphibious objective area support role.
In addition to its TBMD role, SM2 Block IVA represents a critical resource for
the JFMCC in support of the multitude of naval missions that take place
concurrently with

TBMD.

In 2008 , the Navy Area interceptor will be the

primary AW weapon for surfac e combatants riding shotgun for the Cv, escorting

MPS ships, and protecting underway replenishment groups shuttling throughout
the theater resupplying TAG teams, MIF forces, CVBGs and one or more ARGs.
Indeed, this overarching need for conventional force AW prote ction has been a
primary driver for the Evolved S e a Sparrow Missile program, since the

VLS 4-pack will provide

enhanced self-defense for

up more launcher space for

ESSM

platforms, while freeing

VLS

SM2/3 variants.

Platforms , though , w il l still b e a critical c oncern for the JFMCC. If the
defe n de d assets list must be prote c t e d by several TAG te ams , and an

AOA h as

to be defended by Navy Area-capable DDGs, the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander may be confronted by very hard choices regarding

CV and URG escort--cspecially if a credible diesel submarine threat exists. A
recent N aval Institute
enemy

submarine

Proceedings article sums up the aftermath of a hypothetical
succinctly: "How will the n aval component

attack

commander of the Joint Task Force explain that all of his other surfac e ships had
valid missions at the time, and that he had no more available for anti-submarine
" , 1 03

c.
warlare
protectlOn �
.

While

NTW may get the most visibility in its political op erational-strategic

defensive role, Navy Area will be a key milit ary operational-tactical enabler,

allowing friendly forces to regain the initiative and take the offensive. The

JFMCC's operational vision (and its associated timelines) must determine h ow
he apportions his limite d assets between these two vital categories of TBMD in
order to provide the force protection necessary to c omplete his other missions
and thus fulfill the operational intent of the Joint Forc e Commander.

Rules of Engagement

"ROE should not delineate spe cific tactics, should not cover restrictions on
specific system op erations, should not cover safety-related restr ictions, should
not set forth servic e doctrine, tactics, or procedures .

.

.

.

ROE should never be

'rudder orders,' and certainly shoul d n ever substitute for a strategy governing the

use of deployed forc es, in a peacetime crisis or in wartime."I04 S o wrote Captain J.
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Ashley Roach , JAGC, USN, in his seminal 1 9 83 article "Rules of Engagement."
Twenty-five years later, th e TBM challenge of 2008 may forc e the Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander to re evaluate his approach to rules of
e ngagement as they apply to theater ballistic missile defense.

Nature of Modern Conflict: Impac t on

TBM

Defense. NWP 1 - 1 4M, The

Commander's Handbook on the Law if Naval Operations, state s that "US. rules of
engagement reaffirm the right an d the re sponsibility of the

operational

commander generally to seek out, engage and destroy ene my forces consistent
with national objectives , strategy and the law of armed conflict."I05 ROE are
shape d by op erational, political, le gal, and diplomatic forc es,106 and thus tend to
evolve as th ese forc es change over time. The unique operati onal and political
charact eristics of th eater ballistic missiles will have a signal impact on the
evolution of rules of engagement crafted to counter them.
The ease of deployment an d speed of employment asso ciated with theater
ball i stic missiles make the transition from peace to war potentially very rapid
whe n these weapons are available to an aggressor. This de stabilizing alacrity was
noted in the e arly days of Great Power strategic deterrence, wh en the first
ICBMs figured prominently in pessimistic "B olt from the Blue " scenarios for
Armageddon . If theater ballistic missiles can be launched with little warning, and
once laun ched can proceed to their targe ts at velocities measure d in kilometers
per second, then the JCS standin g ROE are likely to be in effect when an initial
TBMD re sponse is require d. To be effective, that resp onse must be re active , rapid,
and robust.
Standing RO E derive from the national right of self defense,107 but once a
TBM leaves its TEL, national rights, international politic s, and missile kinematics
collide. The missile itself may not pose any direct threat to a U S. Navy ship
capable of intercepting it, but in a "worst case " scenario, th e potential
humanitarian and political impact of a single WMD warhe ad striking a foreign
capital or major population center may be so great that the NCA orders a TBMD
engagement. Is this unilateral action to be justified under a loose interpretation
of national self-defense as an effort to prote ct U S. citizens or commercial
interests in the area under attack? Perhaps, for "by the ye ar 2000 , thousands of
U S. nationals and substantial numbers of U S . military forces will be in foreign
lands and vulnerable to potential nuclear attack by nuclear-armed regional
states."I08 If not, though, shall the NCA then cite the inherent rights of individual
and c olle ctive self-defense enumerated in Article 5 1 of the U N . Charter?
These questions are rhetorical, posed to focus attention on the unique nature of
the problem. TBMs may be launched with little or no warning. The warheads they
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are capable of c arrying imply such potent physical c onsequences that a single
successful strike could lead to a political victory for an aggressor. System velocities
are greater than any other weapon except strategic ICBMs. System ranges are such
that TBMs may cross the sovereign territory of uninvolved third parties en route to
their targets. The obvious and troubling corollary is that interception of these same
weapons may thus occur over these

third-p arty countries, raining down

post-engagement debris, unexploded warheads, failed interceptors, and possibly
WMD component contaminants, ranging from fissile materials to lethal chemicals
to biologic agents and toxins. Who will the world opinion hold accountable for
the results: the aggressor-or an unsolicited defender?
Between now and 200 8 , the United S tates is likely to be the only nation with
both the technological infrastructure and financial wherewithal to be able to
develop and deploy naval theater ballistic missile defenses with more than a local
point-defense capability. The NCA, CINC, JFC, and Joint Force Mar itime
Component Commander must carefully ponder the Pandora's box of political
and legal issues thus opened.
NTW capability will vastly expand the regional leverage of the JFMCC. It also

will vastly complicate the traditional "catalytic " employment of naval forces,
described by Roach as overtly p olitical tasking to "deploy units or fleets for the
purpose of catalytic force without any clear obj e c tive s in mind . . . in the hope
that the Navy will do something to resolve the situation and nothing to
09
aggravate it." I Such tasking has always lain at the heart of the "naval presence"
mission, but the time/ spe e d/ distance chall e nges inherent in the ater ballistic
missile defense may well move the execution of that mission b ack toward the
spirit of the 1 8 th and 1 9 th centuries. In that era, the commanding officer of a
warship was expected to act forcefully in the best interests of national p olicy as
expressed in his sailing orders, without recourse to higher authority. In th e age of
theater ballistic missiles, as in the age of sail, that awesome responsibility may
again devolve upon individual naval officers, who may be forced to c arry out
defensive actions that may make national policy without prior or real-time
guidance from national leaders.

110

Defensive Rules oj Engagement must be Permissive.

True "Bolt from the Blue"

strategic attacks are rare. If war is a c ontinuation of p olitics by other means, then
there usually is a progression of political trail blazes leading up to the p oint of
open conflict. That these markers are often se en clearly only in retrospect shows
that, while the actual attack represents merely the culmination of gradually
increasing p olitical hostility, the physical ability to achieve strategic surprise has
remained c onstant from Pearl Harbor to Kuwait City.
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In order to counter the capacity for strategic surprise and p olitical leverage
provided to re gional powers by TBMs, defensive rules of engagement must be
permissive. D espite Roach 's dictum decrying ROE system-specificity, rules of
engagement for theater ball i stic missile de fense must b e shap e d by the unique
nature of the threat. The high velocities attaine d by TBMs and the potential
consequences of WMD warhead use argue the need for very rapid, if not
automatic, engagement. Normally, the counterargument set in opposition to
such a permissive and deadly defensive environment involves the challenge of
de confliction, how best to prevent the possible engagement of friendly assets.
However, the very kinematics that make TBMs such challenging targets also aid
deconfliction. Quite simply, unlike civilian and military aircraft , there is no such
thing as a friendly incoming TBM.
Furthermore , the nature of cueing systems directed against b allistic missiles
entails that the actual target, or most likely area of impact , b e comes clear only as
the

hostile

missile

hur tles along its

trajectory. As previously

explained,

interception is best attempted as early in that traj ectory as possible, in order to
allow time for kill assessment and follow-on shots. Thus, the ROE-driven
decision to engage a TBM with a Theater Wide defensive system needs to be
made before the exact target of the h ostile missile is known. The United States
would therefore be delivering a defensive stroke without being able to articulate
precisely what or who was being defended. Alliances, coalitions, treaties or the
lack thereof would be rendered moo t . Clearly, the legal implications thus arisin g
from the physical characteristics of offensive and defensive systems must be fully
understood and de alt with before these defensive systems are ever deploye d.
One possible approach would be a public declaration by the United States,
based on the same legal reasoning that guides international law regarding piracy.
The 1 95 8 Geneva Convention on the High S eas states in part that "All states
shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state.,,111 The
United States c ould argue that it and other nations have the right to contribute
to the maintenance of internation al peace and security by unilaterally engaging
theater ballistic missiles over the high seas and over land when outside the earth's
atmosphere (exoatmospheric NTW intercept) , for "there is no legally defmed
boundary between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of
outer space . . . [which] . . . begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth 's
atmosphere and extends to infinity.,,112 Appendix B to Enclosure A of the
current

Standing Rules of Engagement for u. s . Forces,

while
113

classification of this paper, is instructive in regard to this issue.
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Such a permissive, unilateral national policy would have to be carefully
couched in terms clearly deriving from the well-defined international right to
repress acts of violence "on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any state." Navy Theater Wide engagements would take place
over the high seas and/or above the airspace of any nation, since this system is
both sea-based and exoatmospheric. Serendipitously, when potential TBM
traj ectories are plotted from likely aggressors to likely targets on the current
world scene, 70 percent of those traj ectories cross international waters at some
.
11.
POlOt.
Successful consummation of an exoatmospheric intercept harms only the
TBM and the interceptor. The SM3 warhead itself is kinetic, with a net explosive
weight of zero (excluding thruster fuel) . It cannot engage an airliner, bomb
shelter, or baby-milk factory. Additionally, exoatmospheric intercept tends to
mitigate the effects of debris on the land below, whether friendly, neutral, or
hostile. Weapons components, toxic compounds, wreckage and errant
interceptors will all tend to fragment, scatter, and burn up upon reentry.
ROE issues involved with Navy Area TBMD are in some ways more easily
resolved. The smaller defended footprint of the Navy Area system can make its
use de facto an act of self-defense by a U. S. warship, especially when employed
against weapons of mass destruction, which might only have to detonate in the
vicinity of the ship in order to be potentially deadly to it and its crew. Unit
self-defense provisions of U.S. ROE might thus suffic e for initial employment of
Navy Area systems in an emergency. Planned, coordinated use of this capability
by the JFMCC during the course of a campaign , however, will require a degree
of international political cooperation in the framing of specific u. s. ROE , as with
the deployment of ground-based area-defense Patriot units to Israel during the
Gulf War.

Offinsive Rules of Engagement Will Be Restrictive. TBMD active defense is a
relatively "pure " form of warfare , a contest of sensors and projectiles that, if
ideally successful, results in no loss of life on either side. Its rules of engagement
can therefore be written as permutations of the universal righ t of unit and
national self-defense.
However, the in-flight interception of TBMs represents only one pill ar of
TBMD. In the c ourse of a regional conflict, a strictly defensive strategy will
almost certainly fail in the long run . Consequently, attack operations, the
aggressive interdiction of TBMs, TELs, and their support infrastructure on the
ground, will be a vital part of any campaign involving TBMD. Nonetheless,
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under the purview of the ]FACC, this portion of the overall TBMD mission is
likely to have very different rules of engagement.
In the early stages of a regional contingency, the ]FMCC may well find himself
dual-hatte d as AAD C and ]FACC, and will once again h ave to resolve
fundamental operational conflicts within the TBMD missi on , this time in regard
to the ROE. The basi c ROE dilemma that he will face with respect to attack
operations is this: tactically, as AADC, he will need rapid, forceful action against
the hostile TBM order ofbattle in order to decrease pressure on his limit ed active
defense TBMD resources. Operati onally, however, as ]FACC, he is likely to fin d
timely execution of attack operations initi ally prohibited by pro scnptIve,
circumspect gui dance from the National Command Author ities.
Consi der, for illustrative purposes, that during NTF Wargame 95B, the Joint
Force Commander:
a. Established initial TMD ROE as the right o f self-defense.
b. Refined the ROE automatically t o identifY as hostile those ballistic
missiles:

1 . D etermined to originate from de signate d hostile nations.
2. De termine d to impact within the defended area of USEUCOM AOR.
3. Assesse d as part of the designated hostile nation operational order of
battle (OOB) .
c. Held that authorization for attack on forces of designate d hostile nations
within the ho stile nation's borders remai ns with the NCA.11S
Specific rules of engagement were (in operational sequence) :
A. The interception of a ballistic missile in self-defe nse (own forces within

kill zone of impact point) is p ermitted.
B. Th e int erception of a ballistic mi ssile, whose pre dicted impact is within
own territory or designated friendly nations, is permitted . . . .
C. The attack on forces of a nation which has been positively identified as
having launched ballistic missiles against own or designated friendly
nations is permitted.
D. The interception of a b allistic missile, whose predicted impact point is
within the territory of third nations, is permitte d. 116
Note that all active defense-relat ed ROE are aligne d with the principles of
self-defense. The NeA, h owever, has retained specific control of authorization
for attack op erations. This cle arly include s the use of TLAM o r other strike
assets available in the same AEGIS

ships that may be

tasked with the

forward-positioned active defense NTW role. Thus, these ships are potentially
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elements of the Joint Force, as directed by the
consequences of success.

JFC. He should prepare
He must plan to work himself out if a job.

for the

Joint TBMD Active Defense Capabilities to 2008
The sequential nature of the events just de scribed is in part a rhetorical
device, emphasizing the essential "enabling" role of the naval c omponent in the
phase d execution of j oint operations. Naval forces will clearly not carry 1 00
percent of the defensive burden until some magic moment in the campaign
when Army, Air Force, and Marine

TBMD assets are suddenly declared to be

sufficiently robust and a time -out is call e d to effect transition of the main effort
to shore-based elements.
As explained in the C2I section of chapter

III , command and control ofj oint
TBMD forces is a dynamic, mutable function. The JFMCC must understand the
capabilities of non-naval systems and be able to incorporate such systems into his
plan as they become available, often before these assets have built up suffic ient
organic strength in theater for their particular component c ommanders to be
considered for overall command of the

TBMD fight .

S everal active defense systems currently under development by other
services are likely to b e operational by this study's target date of2008. All are in
some way c omplementary to Navy Are a and Navy Theater Wide systems.
Some provide unique capabilities not otherwise available to the Joint Forc e
Maritime Comp onent Commander. This section will give a concise overview
of non-naval

TBMD active defense capabilitie s anticipated to b e available in

2008.

Army Active Defense.

TBMD, Army active defense will be built
PAC-3 Patriot providing
area defense and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAA D ) system
covering the upper tier. PAC-3 replaces the GEM interceptor of the final version
of Patriot PAC-2 with the small e r hit-to-kill ERINT (extended range
interc eptor) missile. ERINT is not a unitary kine tic weapon Oike SM3) , since a
Like Navy

around a two-tier concept of defense-in -depth, with

small ring-type tungsten projectile device call e d a "lethality enhancer" is
fitted.

121

Like

SM3, however, ERINT is intended to hit its target dire ctly. Indeed,

this new missile was selected in large measure because of its agile, hit-to-kill
design. A multi-mach kinetic impact is one of the best nonnuclear kill
techniques against the rugged chemical sub munition warhead, a particular
threat that has be come the designated bhe
effectiveness analysis

noire of TBMD cost and operational
(COEA) lethality studies.
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Much like Evolved S ea Sparrow's relationship to the larger, vertically
launched SM2 series, PAC-3 ERINT is designed to use existing launchers-and
also fits four missiles in the same size canister as a single PAC-2 GEM . Thus, lift
requirements for Patriot formations remain unchange d and challenging-but
each fire unit can bring to bear four times its previous complement of
interceptors.
The defended footprint for PAC-3 will be greater than that of PAC-2 GEM,
primarily due to improved kinematics of th e ERINT missile. PAC-2's less
efficient command guidance and track-vi a-missile (TVM) termin al homing are
replaced in ERINT by inertially guided flight to a predicted intercept point,
calculated by the fire control system and programmed int o the missile before
launch, followed by active terminal homing using a K. band emitter. 1 22 As shown
by the results ofRoving S ands 95 , however, the PAC-3 foo tprint will still be only
a fraction of that for Navy Area SM2 Block IVA.
The Army's upper tier of TBMD protection will be provided by THAAD, the
Theater High Altitude Are a Defense system. The system itself is unique in the
TBMD arena in that THAAD missiles can consummate intercepts both outside
and inside the atmosphere. This fills a gap in the Joint Force Mar itime
Component Commander's naval TBMD engagement envelope. NTW is a
strictly exoatmospheric system. As explained in chapter III , many common
shorter range TBMs reach apogee within th e upper atmosphere and are thus
never engage able by NTW Navy area defense is limited by the kinematics and
aerodynamic controls of the SM2 Block IVA missile to a maximum intercept
altitude of 35km. The resulting " engagement gap" is filled by the versatile

THAAD.
Guided by updates from the ground-based radar, the missile uses a specially
shielded IR seeker on a thruster-controlled kinetic kill vehicle to achieve a
hit-to-kill intercept of its TBM targe t. The inevitable engineering tradeoff for
the versatility thus offered by endo- and exoatmospheric capability is no
capability against the TBM ascent phase. This remains the high-leverage
province of the Navy Theater Wide SM3 .
Like Navy Theater Wide, THAAD has been t h e subject o f intense debate in
regard to the ABM Treaty. Treaty compliance has been certified for UOES flight
tests, but questions remain about the type and scope of cueing that future BMC4I
architectures may provide to the highly capable , Strategic D efense
Initiative-derived THAAD ground -based radar. l2A In 2008, any treaty-related
restrictions on full BMC41 integration of this powerful sensor could have a
significant effect on the overall TBMD capability of a j oint power projection
force.
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For the JFMCC, then, the key points of interest regarding Army active de fense
in 2008 include :
•

Capabilities and limitations of the evolved, improved Patriot

P AC-3

lower-tier system. It is still lift-intensive and not tactically mobile (does
not travel with maneuver elements of the ground force) .
•

Highly capable upper-tier system.

THAAD fills the altitude gap in the j oint

TBMD layered-defense concept.
•

THAAD lift requirements are far less challenging than those for Patriot
PAC-3 . A THAA D battalion with 4 fire units and 288 missiles will re quire
40 CS sorties, or 94 C 1 4 1 sorties.

1 25

This will be further ameliorated in

2008 by the contributions of the C 1 7 airlifter.
•

THAAD is not a substitute for Patriot any more than NTW can replace
Navy Area. These are complementary capabilities, and indeed, current
Army doctrine emulates dual-capable

AEGIS ships by placing THAAD and
THAAD and Patriot
formations begin to arrive in theater, the JFMCC must take this into

Patriot in mutually supporting layered enclaves. As

account when configuring the ground-based coverage of an expanding

TBMD plan .
In ideal circumstances, the incorp oration of THAAD and Patriot

PAC-3 in a
fully integrated j oint TBMD active defense plan will allow the JFMCC four
layers of prote ction , with NTW positioned for ascent-phase and long-range
midcourse intercepts, THAAD covering the upper-tier exoatmospheric and
very-high-altitude endoatmospheric threats, Navy area defense providing robust
capability below 3Skm, and fast , agile

PAC-3 destroying leakers in the endgame.

Air Force Active Defense. B oth during and after DESERT STORM, significant
U.S. Air Force contributions to theater ballistic missile defense focused on the
critical task of attack operations and the overall enabling capability of BMC4I ,
espe cially TBM launch detection and defense cueing via TALON SHIELD (and
now ALERT) . However, just as ascent phase intercept represents the highest
leverage form of N avy Th eater Wide active defense, boost phase intercept (BPI)
is an emerging high leverage niche for Air Force active defense.
No

BPI systems are currently fielded, but one concept shows potential for
(ABL) , a modified Boeing 747
transport will be equippe d with a full TBMD BMC4I suite , an infrared tracking
capability by 2008 . Known as the Airborne Laser

and laser ranging sensor-and a chemically fueled, weapons-grade laser firing
through a trainable nose turre t. Wh en a
phase engagement is ordered:
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Ins ide the 747, some 300 to 600 kilometers away, a tracking laser illuminates
the first missile . Its reflected beam meas ures the dis tance betwe en the missile
plume and th e red hot glow of the missile nosecone. A computer aboard the 747
determines the length of the missile body and the missile's location , co urse and di
rection . . . . Invisibly, a second, high- energy las er fires from the 747's nose, s triking
the first missile 's body, which . . . explodes . .
.

.

'26

The ABL aircraft is self-deploying, although, like AWACS , it will require
in-theater support, includin g secure , defended airfields. Additionally, refuelin g
an d maintenance facilities for t h e chemical laser will have t o b e provided.
However, if the system works as intended, it can potentially op erate outside
enemy national airspace, conductin g pre-hostilities anti missile de terrent patrols
much like the NTW AEGIS cruiser described in chapter I I I . Once hostilities
commence, the leverage of such a capable BPI system, espe cially against
WMD-configured theat er ballistic missiles, is unmat ched by any other active
defense cap abili ty, ensuring as it does that all WMD warhead components fall
short of their int ended targets, and optionally on the territory from which they
were launched.
Characte ristics of Air Force TBMD active defense thus of interest to the
JFMCC in
•

2008

include:

A signifi cant degree of uncertainty as to how much capability will actually
exist .

•

The ABL can potentially offer a major non-naval TBMD capability to the
JFM CC early in a conflict . If a not-too-distant air base is available for ABL

staging, or if naval TBMD forc es can secure an airfield "bastion" for ABL
and logistics use, carrier aircraft can provide initial defensive escort for the
laser platform and it can begin operat ions expedit iously.
With a fully integrated BM C4 I architec ture in plac e , ABL would be not only a
primary active defense asset but also an invaluable sensor node, providing very
accurat e cueing to both other ac tive defense systems and attack op erations
forc es. It is thus a bold gamble. For Congressional review, it must show
impressive results, on-schedule and on-budget. If ABL works as hoped, it will
most

certainly

bolst er

the

Air

Force 's

" Global

Reach,

Global

Power"

contribution t o national defense.

Marine Corps Active Defense . As the likely leading ground element of any
power projection op eration in a littoral the ater, the Mari nes have specific
requirements for organic TBMD active defense :
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•

Any such system must be relatively mobile to allow movement with
Marine combat elements once they begin to advance from under the
defended footprint of Navy Area TBMD ships protecting the amphibious
obj ective area.

•

The system must have cap ability against those enemy weapons seen as
most threatening to
short-range missile s,

Marines,

threats such as tactical

to include SS-2 1

and FROG-7 .

aircraft

and

Medium and

long-range TBM threats are not the primary concern and are generally
considered targets for the more capable naval systerru offshore .
With Patriot still insufficiently mobile and the HAWK-successor MEADS
(medium ext ended air defense system-formerly CORPS SAM) in budgetary
limbo, the Corps has continued its proud tradition-of-necessity of wringing
every last ounce of value from its equipment-by modifying the venerable
HAWK system for a limite d TBMD role. Unfortunately, all HAWK missiles will
have been retired from the active USMC inventory during 1 9 9 8 . However, the
Marines are incorporating an improved BMC4l capability in the for m of a
mobile air defense communications platform (ADCP) . The AD CP "receives
TBM

data from the

TPS-S9

radar and from other sources:' including

JTIDS/LINK 1 6 and the tactical data distribution system (TDDS) . 127 JTID S/LINK
1 6 will thus provide connectivity with the 2008 -era j oint data network, while
TDDS receive-capability will allow receipt ofJTAGS and ALERT data. Further
modifications are planne d to the TBM -mission-unique TPS-S9 radar, modifying
it to accept external cueing. l2B

A TBMD area defense system for ground forces which has the true tactical
mobility needed by the Marines will not be fielded until some permutation of
the MEADS program gains sufficient supp ort and funding to achieve initial
operational cap ability (lOC) an d succeed HAWK.

Joint TBMD Command and C ontrol
Though he may have gained crucial early leverage through the adept use of
naval TBMD systems, as a regional conflict progresses, the Joint Force Maritime
Component

Commander will be

able

to

incorp orate

more

and more

capabilities from o ther service components as the necessary systerru arrive in
theater. H e will have to int e grate these systems smoothly into the overall TBMD
plan, both to increase the vigor of that plan and to consciously move toward a
point in the cycle of planning, coordination , and execution where he will be
able to turn over command of the TBMD battle to another component
commander. For example :
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Transition of a JFACC/ AAD C from afloat to ashore may occur when the shore
bas ed capability to perform these responsibilities, to include command and con
trol ofj oint air operations, is established. Factors dictating s u ch a m ove in clude air
sortie generation exceeding JFACC afloat capabilities, the preponderance oftacti
cal air assets shifting ashore, or the shore based facility establishing the best C41 ca
pability to control j oint air operations. 129

The smooth transition of a major subset of a theater operation from one
commander to another is essential. Such transitions can be planned and ordered
in accordance with the evolution of a campaign, or a transition may be required
due to any one of a numb er of the unexpected contingencies that are to be
expected in the fog ofwar . Communications difficultie s, death or disablement of
key personnel, or a sudden shift in the operational or political obj ectives of a
conflict c an all require

the

shifting or restructuring of key command

relationships.
No matter how well he has done, the JFMCC must thus be prepared to hand
off the TBMD fight. To be able to do this expeditiously, he must have planned,
coordinated, and executed the TBMD mission from the outset in a manner that
has been fundamentally understood by all components in the j oint force.

Coordinating the Joint

TBMD

Effort.

"Inherent in effective JTMD operations is

an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural
interoperability.,,130 Chapter I clearly states that in the future, the JFMCC will
have the technical interoperability required, through the joint planning network,
the j oint data network, and the joint composite tracking network. The hardware
and software of a fully netted BMC41 architecture will be there for him to
use-but people will run these systems, people will use them, and people will
approve and execute the TBMD plans that result. Once the main effort of theater
ballistic missile defense b e gins to shift away from naval systems, the greatest
challenge facing the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be
people and the service cultures they represent. He must have procedural
methods and me chanisms in place to ensure that j oint TBMD planning,
coordination, execution, and eventual transition proceed in a manner that is as
integrate d as the technical systems that support these functions.
Common language, common procedures, and a common approach to
problem solving are relatively easy to impose on command and control systems.
It is much harder to do so with the people who use those

systems.

Administratively, this is a function served by Joint Doctrine and a c arefully
codified joint planning process. Operationally, the j ob of coordinating the
execution of a common plan by different systems from different service

71

The Newport Papers
components is very challenging. How this challenge will be answered in 2008 is
not yet clear. However, present day simulations, such as NTF Wargame 95B and
Roving Sands 9 5 , have seen two different approaches to the coordination
problem emerge-the use of a the ater missile defense advisor (TMDA) , and the
cre ation of a theater air defense c ommander (TADC).

Theater Missile Defense Advisor,

"Each intermediate c ommand layer between

the planner and the executor adds latency to orders and data and risks
misinterpretation an d c onfusion , which increases the p robability of error.,, ! 3 1 In
attempting to bolster the joint coordination function , commanders risk striking
a devil's bargain by adding another link to a chain of command already burdened
with the unusually stressing timeline of the TBM D battle. In the USEUCOM
concept used during NTF Wargame 95B, this link was added above the AAD C,
in the person of the Theater Missile D efense Advisor (TMDA) .
"The major role of the TMDA is to plan , coordinate and deconflict TMD
operations (passive defense , active defense, and . . . attack operations) . . . . The
TMDA is responsible for unity of effort in TMD planning and will issue mission
. ,, 1 32 While the TMDA may be a component
type orders to the AAD e.
.

.

commander, he is more likely to be a member of the JFC staff and is thus in effe c t
an agent o f the JFC directing t h e TBMD battle above t h e JFMCC (who, for the
purposes of this study, is tasked as AAD C and JFACC) .
"A TMD c ommand structure is usually formed by assigning available assets
into a relationship that is consistent with the CO NOPS, c omfortable to the
commander in chief (CINC) , and acc eptable to the Service participants.,,133 The
origins of the TMDA "coordination from above " approach lie in t he very
proactive effort by a CI NC (USEUCOM) to answer the question "What can be
done now to improve j oint c oordination of the TBMD battle?" This CINC's
answer has been the creation of the USEUCOM TMD cell, a cadre of TMD
(TBMD and cruise missile defense) c orporate knowledge supported by a
deployable BMC4I node known as " TMD-in-a-box."
This theater-unique aggregate system includes the EUCOM-deploye dJTAGS,
connectivity to current BMC4I assets such as TDDS, and the ability t o use GALE ,
the generic area limitation environment . " Taking a direct feed from the JTAGS,
this terrain delimitation system has . . . refine [d] [a TBM] launch p oint to less than
500 meters in less than 60 seconds." I34 The implications for enhancing attack

operations are obvious.

Having thus created a very capable team, the CINC will be wont to use it . The

intent is clearly to have a mobile c oordination, command and control capability
to support this very difficult mission at whatever level that support is most
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needed. The step from augmentation and advice to direction via " mission type
orders ," however, is a short one.
A theater missile defense advisor, supported by the CINC's TMD cell and its
associated TMD-in-a-box hardware, is clearly in a position to usurp TBMD
command, planning, and execution functions or iginally described in chapter III
as being under the purview of the AADC and JFACC, and thus in this study, the
JFMCe. In large part, this concept is a response-of-necessity by a CINC who
feels that "The lack of an effective theater missile defense is a potential
,, 135
war-stopper fcor th·IS theater.
With a fully-netted TBMD BMC4I architecture still under development, the
leverage provided by a trained staff cadre equipped with a unique, highly capable
command and control node makes the TMDA concept very attractive. It takes
care of business right now. However, in the future, with full BMC4I in place
throughout all components, the JFC might well be able to forestall adding this
"extra link," while keeping the TMD cell to augment the staff of whichever
component commander is designated AAD e. If that commander is the JFMCC,
he should heed the specific mission of the cell, for it is what he must ensure
happens when prosecuting j oint TBMD-" expedite the flow of information,
provide a dedicated focus on the JTMD mission, and provide a 'translation' node
between disparate Service systems ., ,136

Theater Air Defense Commander. Alternatively, an additional coordination "link"
can be added below the component commander level. This approach has also
found favor with a theater CINe. USCENTCOM lessons learned from Roving
Sands 95 read, in part: " Intra and Inter Service TBMD firing coordination is not
yet possible in real time. . . . Up to seven Army and Navy interceptors engaged a
single TBM . . . . The AADC needs to have a multi-service theater air defense
commander to address [these] problems.,,137 Actually, since the proposed theater air
defense commander (TADe) works for the AADC, this particular coordination
enhancement adds two parallel links to the chain of command. While the TADC
coordinates TBMD active defense for the AADC, the complementary urgent
attack commander (UAe) coordinates TBMD attack operations for the JFACe.
For active defense, the main job of the TADC is to "arbitrate the gray areas"
between Service TBMD control centers with overlap ping defended footprints
or overlapping sensor coverage. Under the current architecture, these
subordinate control centers are the Force Air Warfare Commander for naval
TBMD, the Control and Reporting C enter (CRe) for the Air Force, the
Marines' Tactical Air Operations Center (TAO e) , and the Army's Tactical
Operations Center (TO e) for Patriot and eventually for THAAD.
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During Roving Sands 9 5 , when uncoordinated, the se control c enters tended
to engage-by-default. If a TBM was engage able by the weapon system they
controlled, they fired. Kill rates were excellent, but interceptor expenditures
were unsustainably high. S trict apportionment of geographic engagement zones
reduced interceptor wastage to zero-but nine TBMs got through. 13s Cle arly,
some form of dynamic coordination is called for to ensure effective e ngagement
of targe ts with an efficient use of interceptors. This is the gray are a through
which the TADC must navigate.
Again, though , this is an ad- hoc solution to a problem that exists now, due to
systems limitations that exist now. If additional layers of command and control,
such as the TMDA and TAD C, become part ofJoint TBMD doctrine in order to
address these limitations, then it is the responsibility of commanders and
planners to continually evaluate the contribution of these positions as BMC41
technology matures. Once anointed in doctrine, levels of c ommand and control
tend to remain, even as their practical utility is eroded by the evolution of
technology. The j oint TBMD chain of command from CINC to shooter needs to
be as short as possible-so long as that chain can effectively coordinate the
disparate elements of the j oint TBMD force structure into an efficient,
synergistic whole that puts hot metal on target.

Joint TBMD in Coalition Warfare
The raison d 'hre for robust U. S. theater ballistic missile defense capability, to
include forward deployed naval TBMD forces, is the defense of vital American
interests overseas. Admiral Will i am O wens has written:
Sea-based theater-missile defenses , then, should be considered n ot only in military
terms, in which th eir mobility and flexibility figure heavily, but in their political
payoff. They are a prime example of the way advanced military technology with
overseas naval forces

can

provide the kind of deterrence, allian ce maintenance, and

coalition building the new era calls for. D9

As se en during the Gulf War, deterrence, all i ance maintenance, and coalition
building can be fostered by TBMD from all components. In 1 99 1 , these
contributions came from Army Patriot and Special Forces, Navy TACAIR and
SEALs, and Air Force AWACS,jSTARS, S cudCap, and D S P theater early warning.
In

2008, all components will be able to contribute significantly to j oint U.S.

active defense, attack operations, passive defense, and BMC41 capabilities.
However, as these forces build up in the ater, the JFMCC must hark back to his
own raison d '�tre--his mission in support of the Joint Force Commander's
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operational intent. In accordance with the National Military Strategy, that
mission, whenever possible , will be carried out in concert with those same
alliances and coalitions that u. s. TBMD c an do so much to b olster. If theater
b allistic missile defense is an essential enabling capability to allow the Joint Force
to carry out its mission in support of coalition obj ectives in a multinational
(formerly "combine d") operation, then coalition TBMD systems should b e
integrated t o the maximum extent possible into that c ap ability. In order t o d o so,
the ]FMCC and his successors as AADC and ]FACC will ne e d a basic
understanding of evolving foreign TBMD c ap abilities and the significant
barriers to integration which will inevitably exist.

Allied

TBMD

Capabilities. Again making

the allu sion to national systems first

used in chapter II, the evolution of international TBMD cap ability is most
vigorous in areas where environmental pressure caused by an imminent TBM
threat is greatest. Such areas of high selective pressure include northeast Asia and
the Middle E ast.
Israel is a case in point. Surrounded by hostile regional powers since birth, it
has developed not only its own nuclear-capable TBM force , but is n ow
embarked on a substantial active defense program to counter the TBM-WMD
initiatives of Iran, Syria, and Libya, and the demonstrate d capabilities of Iraq. The
indigenously develop ed but u. S . -supported ARROW interceptor program
began in 1 988 and has now evolved into ACES (ARROW Continuation
Experiments) , using the ARROW 2 missil e . 140 " The U. S . , which is providing the
maj ority of funding for ARROW, will use the results of flight trials to reduce the
risk associated with national programs such as THAAD.,,141
Faced by a bellicose, impoverished, unstable, TBM-capable North Korea,
Japan may soon leverage its technological investment in the AEGIS program into
its own substantial naval TBMD capability. " The Japanese Maritime Self D efense
Force is indicating a growing interest in e quipping their existing . . . and planned
. . . AEGIS destroyers with Theater Wide c apability for the defense ofJapan.,,142
Other nations have either expressed interest in particular aspects of U.S.
TBMD capability or already posse ss " entry level" TBMD systems such as Patriot
PAC-2 . NATO states will take part in the c ollective implementation of LINK 1 6 ,
the designated precursor of the future joint data network. S till others are
pursuing cooperative national programs or are planning to buy newly available
Russian active defense systems such as the S-300PMU- l GRUMB LE or SA-1 2
GLADIATOR/GIANT family.
The proliferation of such capabilities should be seen as a p o sitive trend, for it
provides a defensive means of restoring a TBM-perturb ed balance of regional
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Planning carried out to counter it must thus be comprehensive, flexible, and
capable of execution through both j oint

and

multinational operations. Even

without all the facts, planning and preparation for the

TBMD battle must evolve

along with the threat, for the evolution of that threat over the next ten years is
not

in doubt-it is certain.
TBMD and the Maritime C omp onent C ommander

The ages-old utility of deployed naval forces rests on two simple facts: naval
forces are versatile, and naval force s are present. No matter how great a particular
capability may be, it is of little use to a CINC if it is not present in theater when
needed. Assuming that the traditional nature of their employment will continue
through 2008 , naval forces will be present, available for crisis-response orders
from the regional CINCs. These forces are planned, programme d, and budgeted
to receive significant

TBMD capability by 2008.

A naval officer can observe the evolution of the

TBM threat ; he c an track the

national response through the planning, programmi n g, and budgeting system;
and he can watch how Navy TBMD systems fare in the POM (program obj e ctive
memorandum) . He should begin to look at this emerging operational challenge,
and frame questions (when will
get answers, and others

SM2 Block IVA reach IO C?) for which he may

(when will Iranian Scud chemical submunition

warheads reach IOC?) for which he will not. The evolution of

TBM-WMD

systems presents such an unprecedented challenge that the number of questions
on any flag officer's "I want to know" list will always exceed the available
answers, well past 2008 .
This study has not attempted to provide answers to the maj or questions likely
to confront the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander executing the

TBMD mission in 2008. To do so would be intellec tually presumptuous and
factually dishonest-because the answers are not out there. Even if they were,
the conditions bounding any given operational situation are unique and
mutable. For a given contingency in 2008 , what countries will be involved?
What U. S. interests will be threatened? If ajoint force is committed, what will be
the CINC's goals, and what, therefore, will be the JFC's missions and the
resources dedicated to accomplishing them? Under what political constraints

will the NCA, the CINC, and the JFC have to operate ?
That said, though, this study is premised on the assumption that it is
worthwhile for the naval officer to think about this problem, to reflect upon

what he knows and what he does not know, in order to be tter frame the
decisions he may have to make eventually in a foreseeable U. S. response to an
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imminent threat . Rather than looking for spe cific

answers to

nebulous

questions, this study has attempted to establish first principle s-areas of
concentration such as logistics; c ommand, control, and intelligence; warfighting;
and rules of engagement. The naval officer might best focus his intellect on these
aspects of the theater ballistic missile defense problem he may fac e in the future
as naval forc es under his command operate

in a deterrent posture , escalate to the

first U. S. force s involved in a TBM-WMD regional conf1ict, and "hold open the
door" for the follow-on TBMD cap abilities of the j oint force.
During the process of research , reflection, and preparation of Theater Ballistic
Missile Difense from the Sea : Issues for the Ma ritime Component Commander, three
themes be came prominent. They are the keys to understanding what the Joint
Force Maritime Component Commander will find of value when he is
preparing to deploy in 2008 ; they also are the keys that any other officer in the
chain of command who is responsible for countering the TBM-WMD threat
must understand. These themes are :
•

The challenge of conflicting missions and limite d means.

•

The reality of hard choices.

•

The fact that theater ballistic missile defense is one mission enabling many,
rather than an end in itself.

Conflicting Missions, Limited Means .

When making his initial reckoning of

what is known and what is unknown, the Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander must consider the nature of the threat , the nature of the mission
responding to it, and the operational intent of the NCA, the CINC, and the Joint
Force Commander. The nature of the threat will determine how the JFMCC
would wish to apportion his TBM D forces, and, given th e limited means
available to him, the scope of the mission will tell him whether or not he will b e
able t o d o so. The operational intent o f the national and theater-level
commanders will indicate how much or how little freedom the JFM CC can
expect to have in carryin g out actions that support that intent.
So, for example , if the immediate goal of the NCA centers on coalition
building prior to contemplation of offensive operations, then TBMD efforts are
likely to be p olitically driven , dedicated to highly visible protection of friendly
regional population centers on the CINC's defended assets list . These actions
will be closely controlled from above. Conversely, once the operational focus
shifts to preparations for the offensive , the JFMCC may have more freedom of
action-but also a far greater number of tasks to be accomplishe d with his
limited maritime component assets. In addition to TBMD, his force s may be
called upon to carry out many naval missions in theater, perhaps including sea
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control, embargo enforcement, MPS e scort , mine warfare, littoral USW, and
finally strike and amphibious power proj ection in support of offensive
operations.
The overarching constraint of limited means must inform the JFMCC's every
decision. While by no means unique to the TBMD mission, this constraint will
be more acutely felt due to the dreadful consequences of even a single failure. A
clear grasp of the CINC's operational intent will allow an initial triage of
missions, what must be done now versus what can wait ; but even then the
tyranny of numb ers and the chall e nge of distance may force an apportionment
of assets that is more thin than doctrine demands. Escorts may have to be pull e d
away from the c arrier in order to guard the DAL. A Navy Area DD G, its SM2
Block IVA interc eptors expended, may have to transit without rearming t o a
vital TLAM launch baske t when the primary Tomahawk shooter suffers an
equipment casualty. An NTW cruiser may have to remain on-station despite
falling more and more into a critical fuel state. This inevitable collision oflimite d
means with conflicting missions implies that while doctrine can b e a guide, any
presumptive answer will have to be scrutinized with regard to the mission and
the particularities of the actual situation . Every decision will be a compromise,
and every c ompromise implies hard choices.

Reality of Hard Choices.

The hard choices faced by the Joint Force Maritime

Component Commander will involve more than mission priority and unit
tasking. The JFMCC must understand the essential nature of the TBMD mission
so well that he can take a vigorous and articulate stand on fundamental issues of
command and c ontrol. With centralized planning and decentralized execution
as his goal, he must balance the need for defensive effe ctiveness with the
requirement for efficiency driven by his limited interc eptor inventory-and
make a choice.
For instance, as AAD C, he must decide how much of the Theater Wide
engagement coordination function he will leave to his subordinate commanders
and the automated BMC4I architecture, and how much he will reserve for
himself and his staff. The process of making this hard choice must be timely,
responsive-and

iterative.

ever-changing. Thus,

the

The
ability

TBMD

battle

will

of the JFMCC, as

be

fast ,

fluid,

Area Air

and

D efense

Commander, to observe, orient , decide, and act must be at least as fast-and
always ongoing. The level of engagement coordination may require fine-tuning
from day to day, hour to hour, or even minute to minute. The JFMCC must
appreciate this situation and be able to impose his will upon it.
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Hard choices also imply acceptance of risk. Constrained by limited means, the
]FMCC may be able to defer some missions. Others he will plainly and simply

have to carry out.
Indeed, the matter of calculated risk permeates realistic planning for TBMD,
from logistical questions of acceptable fuel states and marginal rearming ports to
political compromises between force protection and foreign population defense.
Thus, if the ascent-phase NTW mission is deemed essential by the NCA, but not
enough AEGIS ships are available to support forward-positioned TAG teams, then
the ] FMCC may acknowledge the TAG concept-yet press on with an NTW ship
sent in harm's way, at best with a non-AEGIS consort but perhaps, at worst, alone.
Political factors bear directly on hard choices regarding rules of engagement. The
]FMCC has a duty to his subordinate comman ders to press for ROE that increase

their freedom of action and decrease the risk to their ships, aircraft, and crews. He
also has a duty up the chain of command. The ] FMCC must display the nicest
respect for the responsibilities of senior civilian and military authorities, doing his
utmost to understand the policies, objectives, and instructions his force is being used
to implement, assuring that those authorities are informed to their complete
satisfaction of any aspect of his force's operations and plans. Thus, with regard to the
more offensive tasks ofTBMD, such as attack operations, the ]FMCC will specify the
tactical and operational advantages thus offered, but place those concerns with due
regard for their subordination to overall national policy. His aim must be to assure
that the " catalytic" use of naval power truly supports national policy, helping to
resolve conflict rather than accelerating or exacerbating it.
Finally, when directed by the Joint Force Commander, the ]FMCC must be
able to make the hard choice to relinquish the TBMD battle to the commander
of another c omponent. To do so effectively, he must have made othe r choices in
preparation for the transition, beginning with a decision to plan his TBMD fight
j ointly. To the greatest extent possible, planning methods, language , and
exe cution should adhere to c ommonly held j oint standards. Otherwise, the
TBMD battle cannot be handed off expeditiously as the fight moves inland from

the littoral. The ] FMCC must make the hard choice early to e schew the naval
tradition of improvisation and bring his likely relief into the process as early as
possible, "training" him, in effect, for a seamless turnover.

One Mission Enabling Many.
component

to

The

c omponent, of the

importance
transition

of that

from

afloat

turnover from
to

ashore, is

representative of the very essence of theater balli stic missile defense. Though this
mission may well b e gin under the purview of the maritime c omponent , it
belongs to all components, for, like the threat which it c ounters, TBM D
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transcends traditional boundaries. I t

is one mission that enables many and can

therefore never be considered in isolation .
The pace of current research and development , the maj or funding that must
be apportioned among competing systems, and the detailed media coverage of
defense industry developments all tend to focus the attention of officers upon
TBMD as an end in itself It is indeed a unique mission-but it does not stand
alone. TBMD is a tool that allows other missions to proceed toward the strategic
obj e ctive-remembering that (to use one example) "from the point of view of
Israeli, Saudi, or other coalition leaders and populations, any attempt to
distinguish . . . threats and defenses as either 'theater' or 'strategic ' is in effect to
7

create a distinction without a difference.,,14

To that end, the officer charged with TBMD planning and execution for
any comp onent sh ould maintain a clear operational vision . He must see
TBMD as an enabling mission in support of the CIN C 's op erational intent
and the N CA's strategic go als. He must acknowledge it as being inherently a
J omt nuSSlOn.
As such, TBMD in

2008 will depend on the unifying and coordinating power

of BMC4I . Only upon the supp orting plinth of battle management command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence can the TBMD pillars
postulated for the future stand. Without netted planning, netted data, and netted
composite tracks, joint coordination and execution at the speed required for the
TBMD battle will be impossible.
That said , this same officer must beware of te chnological overconfidence.
New systems will work , and work well-but seldom as well as engineers and
tacticians hope. For that reason , planners and commanders must hold to th e
goal of centralized planning with de centralized execution . Such a vision will
better survive Clausewitz's "friction ," which comprehends why even the most
reliable technological systems perform less well un der the tremendous pressure
of war.
Of course, the pressure of war affects the performance of men as well as
machines. What men uniquely perform is high-level reasoning and creative
thinking; both of these decline abruptly under stress. I t follows, then , that the
JFM CC-and everyone in the chain of command above and below him-must
bear this in mind as they envision operations against the threat ofWMD-armed
ballistic missiles. Whether the commander suc ceeds or fails in countering that
threat probably will be determined principally by how well he has prepared
himself and his subordinates for so demanding a trial by combat.
This study has been a spotting round, something to begin to get the range on
a problem which may require many salvos in the future. If it has been at all
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successful, that has been because it marks some of the right issues and identifies
important questions. These issues and que stions, and many others, will of course
iequire further study.
In a fractious world that often seems to have lost its bearings, theater ball i stic
missile defense delivered from the sea will give the United States a vital and
flexible capability to counter the growing threat of TBMs-and the horrific
weapons of mass destruction they can carry. For the naval officer who must
actually sail upon that sea and personally defeat an enemy wh o would use such
weapons, this great defensive capability cannot be considered in isolation-

In war, the defensive exists mainly that
the offensive may act more freely.
Alfred Thayer Mahan

Naval Strategy, 1 9 1 1

An extract and adaptation of this paper appeared in the form of an article in the Spring 1 9 97
issue of the Naval War College Review.
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Glossary ofAbbreviations
AAD C

Area air defense c ommander

AW

Air Warfare

ABL

Airborne laser

ABM

Anti-ballistic missile

ACES

ARROW continuation experiments

ACTO

Advanced concept technology demonstration

AD

Destroyer tender

AD C P

Air defense c ommunications platform

AD G

Ac tive defense group

ALERT

Attack and launch early report to theater

AO

Oiler

AOA

Amphibious obj ec tive area

AOE

Fast combat support ship

AOR

Area of respo nsibility

ARG

Amphibious ready group

AS

Submarine tender

ASAS

Advanced s olid axial stage

ASCM

Anti-ship cruise missiles

ATACMS

Army tactical missile system

AWACS

Airborne warning and co ntrol system

BOA

Battle damage assessment

BMC41

Battle management command, control, communications,

BMDO

B allistic Missile Defense O rganization

BPI

Boost-phase intercept

BUMBLEBEE

Early USN AW missile program

C2

C o mmand and co ntrol

CAP

Combat air patrol

computers , and intelligence

CE C

Cooperative engagement capability

CENTCOM

United S tates Central Command

CEP

Circ ular error probable

CG

Guided-missile cruiser

CIC

Combat information center

CINC

Commander in chief

CIWS

Close-in weapon system

C NA

Center for Naval Analyses

CNN

Cable News Network

CO

Commanding officer

COEA

Cost and operational effectiveness analysis
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CONOPS

Concept of operations

CONUS

Continental United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii)
Control and reporting center

CRC
CRP

Controllable/ reversible pitch

CVBG

Aircraft c arrier battle group

CVN

Aircraft c arrier, nuclear-powered

CW

Chemical warfare

DAL

Defended asse ts list

DDG
DE

Dire ct ed energy

DIA
D oD

Defense Intelli gen ce Agency
Department of Defense

DSP
ECS

Defense Supp ort Program
Engagement control station
Emissions control

EMCON
ERINT

Guided-missile destroyer

[patriot] extended range interceptor

EW

Evolved Sea Sparrow missile
E arly warning

FPPWP

First preplanned waypoint

ESSM

FPTO C

Forc e projection t actical op erations center

FRO G
FU

Free rocket over ground
Fire units

GALE

Generic area limitation environment

GBR

[THAAD]

GCCS

Global command and control system

Ground-based radar

GEM

[patriot] Guidance enhanced missile

GFCS

Gun fire control system

GPS

Global Positioning Syst em

HARM
HEU
I CBM

High-sp eed antiradiation missile
Highly enriched uranium

ICC

Information Coordination Central

IND I G O

TLAM tasking message

IOC
IPB

Initial operational capability

IR

Infrared

Intercontinental ball i stic missile

Intelligence preparation of the b attle space

IRST

Infrared search and track

J CS
JCTN

Joint Chiefs of S taff

JDN
JFAC C
JFC

Joint composi t e tracking network
Joint data network
Joint force air comp onent commander
Joint force c ommander
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JFMCC

Jo i n t force maritime comp onent c ommander

JMCIS
JPN
JSOC
JSTARS
JTAGS
JTIDS
JTMD
KE
KKV
KW

Joint maritime command information system

Joint plan ning network

Join t S p e cial Op erations Command
Join t surve illance and target attack radar system
Joint tactical groun d station

Joint tactical information distribution system
Joint theater missile defense
Kinetic en ergy
Ki n e ti c kill ve hi cle
-

Kinetic warhead

LAMPS

Light airborne multipurp ose system

LS
MASINT

Laun ching st atio n

MEADS
MEZ

M e dium extended air defense system
(formerly CORPS SAM)
Mi ssile engagement zone

MIF

M ari time interdiction force

MIW
MLRS
MOPP
MPS
MRBM
MTCR

Measurement and signals intelligen c e

Mine warfare
Mul tip le launch ro cke t system
Mission-oriented pro t e c t ive p osture

M ari time prepositioning ship
M e dium-rang e ballistic missile
Missile technology control regime

NAVCENT

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Naval Forc e s U.S. Central Command

NCA

N ationa! Comman d Auth or i ty

NTD C
NTF

Non-tactical data colle ction

Nato

,

NTW

National te st facility
Navy Theater Wide

OOB

Operational order of battle

GODA

Observe, or i e n t decide, act

PAC
Pl
PO M
PST
QR
R&D
RAS
RCS

Patriot advanced capability

RF

ROE

,

Probability of kill

Program objective memorandum
Pre cision -strike Tomahawk
Quick response
Rese arch and development
Replenishment at sea

Radar cross-section
Radio frequency
Rules of engagement
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RV
SAM

Reentry vehicle
Surface-to-air missile

SAT C O M
SBIRS -LOW

Satellite communications

SBWS

Space-based warning system (D SP

ScudCap

Scud combat air p atrol

SOlO

Strategic Defense Initiative Office

SEALs
SL O C

Sea, air, land (te am)

SMTS
SOF

Space and missile tracking system
Special operations forces

SRBM

Short-range ballistic missile

Space-based infrared system-low earth orbit
TES)

Sea line of communication

STO

Systems test officer

SUW
TACAIR
TACDAR

Surface Warfare
Tactical aircraft

TAD
TAD C

+

Tactical detection and reportin g
Theater air defense
Theater air defense commander

TAG
TAO C

TBMD action group

TBM

Theater b allistic missile

Tactical air operations center

TBM-WMD

Th eater b allistic missile-weapons of mass de struction

TBMD
TBMD ROE

Theater balli stic missile defense
Theater ballistic missile defense rules of engagement

TD DS

Tactical data distribution system

TEL

Transp orter-erector-launcher (for TBM)

TEN CAP

Tactical exploitation of national capabilities

TES

Tactical event system
Theater high-altitude are a defense

THAAD
TIES
TLAM
TM
TMD
TMDA
TO C
TPFDL

Tactical information broadcast service
Tomahawk land attack missile
Theater missile
Theater missile defense
Theater missile defense advisor
Tactical operations c enter
Time-phased force deployment list

TPT

Theater planning tool

TRAP

TRE and related applications (now TDDS)

TRE

Tactical receive equipment

TS C

TOMAHAWK strike coordinator

TVM
UAC

Track-via-missile
Urgent attack c omman der
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UOES

User operational evaluation syste m

UR G

Underway replenishment group

USEUCO M

United States European Command

USS O CO M

United States Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM

United States Space Command

USSTRATCOM

United States Strate gic Command

USW

Undersea warfare

VLA

Vertic al-launch ASRO C

VLS

Vertical launch system
Vertical launch system underway replenishment

VLS UNREP
WMD

Weapons of mass destruction
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